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Abstract. Economic uncertainty may aﬀect significantly people’s behavior and hence
macroeconomic variables. It is thus important to understand how people behave in
presence of diﬀerent kinds of economic risk. The present dissertation focuses therefore
on the impact of the uncertainty in capital and labor income on the individual saving
behavior. The underlying uncertain variables are here modeled as stochastic processes
that each obey a specific stochastic diﬀerential equation, where uncertainty stems either
from Poisson or Le´vy processes. The results on the optimal behavior are derived by
maximizing the individual expected lifetime utility. The first chapter is concerned with
the necessary mathematical tools, the change-of-variables formula and the Hamilton-
Jacobi-Bellman equation under Poisson uncertainty. We extend their possible field of
application in order make them appropriate for the analysis of the dynamic stochastic
optimization problems occurring in the following chapters and elsewhere. The second
chapter considers an optimum-saving problem with labor income, where capital risk
stems from asset prices that follow geometric Le´vy processes. Chapter 3, finally, studies
the optimal saving behavior if agents face not only risk but also uncertain spells of
unemployment. To this end, we turn back to Poisson processes, which here are used to
model properly the separation and matching process.
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Introduction and Summary
Uncertainty in economic variables is a major concern of individuals and may aﬀect
their decisions on, for example, saving or investment considerably. The presence of un-
certainty may thus have a significant impact on macroeconomic variables, such as the
capital stock or the output of an economy. It is hence for both individuals and policy
makers important to understand how economic uncertainty – or risk, as it is also called
among economists – aﬀects individual behavior.
In the present thesis we focus on the impact of the uncertainty in capital and labor
income. More precisely, we study the optimal saving behavior of an agent facing either
uncertain returns from his capital investments or risk of unemployment. The results
are derived by maximizing the agent’s expected lifetime utility in continuous time. The
underlying uncertain variables, such as asset prices, are here, and as typically done in
the economic literature, modeled as stochastic processes by assuming they each obey
a specific stochastic diﬀerential equation. The advantage of this kind of modeling is
that mathematical theory provides a bunch of, to a certain extent, well-known tools
that can be used in the following analysis. Most prominently, these are the change-of-
variables formula (sometimes referred to as “Ito’s-Lemma”) for deriving the diﬀerentials of
mappings of stochastic processes and the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation for tackling
dynamic stochastic optimization problems, such as the expected-utility maximization
problem occurring subsequently. The thesis proceeds as follows. The first chapter is
concerned with the generalization of the aforementioned mathematical methods, i.e.,
the change-of-variables formula and the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation. The second
chapter studies the optimal saving behavior assuming uncertainty in capital income, while
the last chapter is dedicated to the impact of risk of unemployment and the uncertain
job search process.
The first chapter “Controlled Stochastic Diﬀerential Equations under Poisson Uncer-
tainty and with Unbounded Utility” deals with the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation
for solving optimal stochastic control problems as occurring in the subsequent chapters
and elsewhere in the economic literature. We assume here that uncertainty stems from
vii
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Poisson processes. So far, applying the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation has required
strong assumptions on the model, such as a bounded utility function and bounded co-
eﬃcients in the controlled diﬀerential equation. This chapter relaxes these assumptions.
We show that one can still use the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation as a necessary
criterion for optimality if the utility function and the coeﬃcients are linearly bounded.
We also derive suﬃciency in a verification theorem without imposing any boundedness
condition at all. Finally, we show that the result on necessity extends to the case in
which Brownian motion as an additional source for uncertainty is taken into account.
An accompanying paper, Sennewald and Wa¨lde (2006), illustrates the results derived in
this chapters. There we consider an optimum consumption and investment problem with
labor income, where uncertainty of the risky-asset price stems from a Poisson process.
In the second chapter “Keynes-Ramsey Rules in Continuous-Time Setups Under Le´vy
Uncertainty” we propose a more general modeling of uncertain asset prices by introduc-
ing Le´vy processes. Here we describe the optimal consumption behavior by means of
a Keynes-Ramsey rule. Observe that so far, Keynes-Ramsey rules for describing the
optimal consumption behavior in a continuous time setup under uncertainty have been
“incomplete” in the sense that they merely provide the evolution of the marginal utility
process, but not the evolution of the optimal consumption process itself. Only recently,
“complete” Keynes-Ramsey rules have been derived in a setup with CRRA (constant
relative risk aversion) utility functions and uncertainty caused by Brownian motion or
Poisson processes. These processes, however, only provide a limited tool for modeling
dynamic uncertainty and new results can be achieved by using Le´vy processes. This
chapter therefore shows how the evolution of the optimal consumption process can be
derived if uncertainty stems from a Le´vy process and the consumption function is not
necessarily of the CRRA type.
In the third and last chapter, titled “Optimal Saving under Risk of Unemployment”,
we consider an optimum consumption problem in which an agent is exposed to both risk
and uncertain spells of unemployment. The back and forth in the employment status
is properly modeled by a stochastic diﬀerential equation with Poisson processes. The
resulting stochastic income process gives rise to precautionary saving which decreases
in the level of wealth. We find that this excess saving, jointly with the jumps in labor
income, lead to consumption paths that are totally diﬀerent from what we know from
deterministic setups. In particular, there can be, dependent on the interest rate, target
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saving or temporary poverty traps. We further find that uncertainty in the employment
status raises the average (though not necessary the actual) consumption growth.
Many people have contributed to the present thesis. First and foremost, I am indebted
to my supervisor, Klaus Wa¨lde, for his support, encouragement, ideas, comments, and
discussions. Further thanks are due to my former colleagues at Dresden University of
Technology, among them in particular Udo Broll and Jens Eisenschmidt, and numerous
participants at research seminars for valuable comments and fruitful discussions that have
had influence on the works as presented therein. I also wish to thank the Dresden branch
of the Institute for Economic Research (Ifo) and the Hebrew University of Jerusalem
whose hospitality I had enjoyed for several months. Financial support from the State of
Saxony is gratefully acknowledged. Finally, a personal word of gratitude to my family
and friends for their encouragement and support.

Part 1
Mathematical Methods

CHAPTER 1
Controlled Stochastic Diﬀerential Equations under Poisson
Uncertainty and with Unbounded Utility∗
Abstract. The present paper is concerned with the optimal control of stochastic dif-
ferential equations, where uncertainty stems from Poisson processes. Optimal behavior
(e.g., optimal consumption) is usually determined by employing the Hamilton-Jacobi-
Bellman equation. This requires strong assumptions on the model, such as a bounded
utility function and bounded coeﬃcients in the controlled diﬀerential equation. The
present paper relaxes these assumptions. We show that one can still use the Hamilton-
Jacobi-Bellman equation as a necessary criterion for optimality if the utility function
and the coeﬃcients are linearly bounded. We also derive suﬃciency in a verification
theorem without imposing any boundedness condition at all. It is finally shown that,
under very mild assumptions, an optimal Markov control is optimal even within the
class of general controls.
JEL classification: C61
Keywords: Stochastic diﬀerential equation, Poisson processes, Bellman equation
∗I am indebted to Udo Broll, Jens Eisenschmidt, Christoph Schlegel, Klaus Wa¨lde, and Joseph Zeira
for helpful suggestions and discussions and to two anonymous referees for very constructive comments.
This article is published in the Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control and throughout the thesis
cited as Sennewald (2007).
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1. Introduction
This paper is concerned with the optimal control of stochastic diﬀerential equations
(SDEs) in an infinite time horizon setup where uncertainty stems from one or more Pois-
son processes. Such controlled SDEs are a standard tool in the economic literature for
modeling dynamic behavior of economic variables that are hit by randomly occurring
shocks and that can be controlled by an agent. They can be found (in a determin-
istic disguise) in quality-ladder models of growth (e.g., Grossman and Helpman, 1991,
Segerstrom, 1998, Howitt, 1999), in the endogenous cycles and growth literature with un-
certainty (e.g., Wa¨lde, 1999, 2005, Steger, 2005), in the Mortensen-Pissaridis type labor
market literature (e.g., Mortensen, 1994, Pissaridis, 2000), and in finance (e.g., Merton,
1971 and subsequent work), to name only a few applications. Often, Poisson processes are
included as a special case in a framework with jump-diﬀusion, piecewise deterministic or
general Markov processes, see, e.g., Aase (1984), Bellamy (2001), Framstad et al. (2001),
and, in a more mathematical context, Davis (1993) or Fleming and Soner (1993).
Usually, the objective consists in finding an optimal control that maximizes (or min-
imizes) a certain performance criterion. Consider, for example, the following extension
of Merton’s (1971) optimal consumption and portfolio problem.1 A household can invest
its wealth a either in a safe bank account with interest rate r2 or in a risky asset whose
price grows continuously at the rate r1 and jumps at random points in time by β × 100
percent. The random times are modeled by the jump times of a Poisson processes N and
occur with a frequency λ > 0, the arrival rate of N . At each instant t, the household
receives labor income w and consumes the amount ct. Then its budget constraint obeys
the SDE,
dat = [r1bt + r2 (at − bt) + w − ct] dt+ βbt−dNt, (1)
where bt stands for the amount invested in the risky asset. Given the household’s time
preference rate ρ > 0 and the CRRA (constant relative risk aversion) utility function
u (c) = c
1−σ−1
1−σ , σ > 0, σ 6= 1, the household’s objective is to find the optimal consumption
and investment stream that maximize the expected lifetime utility Es
R∞
s e
−ρ(t−s)u (ct) dt
subject to budget constraint (1).
The performance achieved with the optimal control is called the value function. As
is well known, under certain assumptions the value function and, if existing, the optimal
1For more details see Section 3 of the accompanying paper Sennewald and Wa¨lde (2006).
1. INTRODUCTION 5
Markov control satisfy a partial diﬀerential equation, generally known as the Hamilton-
Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation. On the other hand, if there is a function and a Markov
control solving the HJB equation and satisfying certain terminal conditions, this function
is the value function and the Markov control is optimal. Hence, the HJB equation provides
both a necessary and suﬃcient criterion for optimality. In the economic literature, Merton
(1971) was one of the first to state a HJB equation for an optimal control problem with
Poisson processes. Since then it has found widespread use.
Unfortunately, the required conditions that allow the application of the HJB equa-
tion as either necessary or suﬃcient criterion are rather strong. In particular, besides
a suﬃciently smooth value function, many authors assume the utility or cost function
to be bounded, see, e.g., Gihman and Skorohod (1979) for jump-diﬀusion processes or
Dempster (1991) and Davis (1993) for piecewise deterministic processes.2 The same ap-
plies for the coeﬃcient functions in the controlled SDE, which govern the evolution of the
controlled process. Other authors impose, instead of boundedness, other underlying con-
ditions, such as a countable state and action space, cf., e.g., van Dijk (1988) for controlled
jump processes. In some cases the required conditions are rather diﬃcult to check with-
out strong mathematical background, see, e.g., Kushner (1967) and Fleming and Soner
(1993), who assume the value function to be in the domain of the infinitesimal generator
of the controlled Markov process or the Dynkin formula to hold. Kushner (1967) requires
furthermore a certain uniform integrability condition. In other cases, precise assumptions
on, for example, utility are missing, or the HJB equation is derived at a rather heuristic
level, see, e.g., Kushner (1967), Malliaris and Brock (1982), Kushner and Dupuis (1992),
Fleming and Soner (1993), and Dixit and Pindyck (1994).3
If one thinks, for example, of the frequently used class of CRRA utility functions, such
as given in the example above, and considers that the consumption stream ct may grow
toward infinity, the condition of bounded utility is apparently too strong for economic
modeling. Also, in light of, for example, budget constraint (1), the assumption of bounded
2If the smoothness conditions are not satisfied, the value function can still be a viscosity solution of
the HJB equation. This result was first derived by Crandall and Lions (1983) for general HJB equations.
An excellent survey on that issue is provided by Crandall, Ishi, and Lions (1992).
3In both Kushner (1967) and Fleming and Soner (1993) only the necessity part is derived heuristically,
whereas suﬃciency is proven rigorously.
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coeﬃcients in the controlled SDE is obviously too restrictive.4 Further, the assumption
of countable state or action spaces is not convenient.
The objective of the present paper is therefore to present rigorous proofs for the
necessity and suﬃciency of the HJB equation under weaker assumptions than before. In
particular, to show necessity, we only require linear boundedness of the utility function
and of the coeﬃcients, whereas for deriving suﬃciency we do not impose – apart from
a terminal condition – any boundedness restrictions at all. Additionally, since the HJB
equation applies only for Markov controls, and one might feel that considering Markov
controls only is too restrictive, it is also shown that the performance of Markov controls is
as that good as for any other class of controls. That is, an optimal Markov control is also
optimal within the class of general controls. Finally, as a major tool for the derivations in
this paper and also because of its relevance in economic modeling, a change-of-variables
formula (CVF ) is presented which can directly be applied on multidimensional SDEs
with many Poisson processes.
For discrete time and in a deterministic environment, Rinco´n-Zapatero and Rodriguez-
Palmero (2003) and Le Van and Morhaim (2002) study a similar problem. They show
for unbounded utility that the HJB equation possesses a unique solution and that this
solution is the value function. In this paper, the HJB equation is derived via the dynamic
programming approach, cf. Kushner and Dupuis (1992) and Fleming and Soner (1993).
It is crucial for the necessity property of the HJB equation that the value function be-
longs to the domain of the infinitesimal generator of the controlled process, what, e.g.,
Fleming and Soner (1993) simply assumed. Herein lies a major improvement compared
to the literature. Whereas this condition was so far almost trivially satisfied due to the
boundedness assumption for the utility and coeﬃcient functions, we show that it also
holds true for the more general case where these functions are linearly bounded.
The proof of suﬃciency draws from the fact that Poisson processes are, unlike Brown-
ian motion and general Markov processes, of bounded variation. This property implicates
according to Garc´ıa and Griego (1994) that any stochastic integral with respect to a com-
pensated Poisson process is a martingale if the integrand is an adapted and ca´dla´g process.
In turn, the Dynkin formula, which is fundamental for the proof, holds for fairly general
4Consider, for example, the “jump coeﬃcient” in (1): As bt is not bounded, βbt will be neither.
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processes and functions. That finally permits the mild assumptions we impose for the
suﬃciency part.5
Our result on the performance of Markov controls was derived by, e.g., Gihman and
Skorohod (1979) and Fleming and Soner (1993), but under stronger assumptions, as
mentioned above. For the proof we adopt the arguments given in Øksendal (2003), who
arrives at an analogous conclusion for controlled diﬀusion processes.
Supposing similar boundedness assumptions as in the paper at hand, Krylov (1980)
derives necessity of the HJB equation for controlled diﬀusion processes without jumps.
Here we show that the necessity property extends to the Poisson-diﬀusion setup. Suﬃ-
ciency for that setup, on the other hand, requires assumptions such as certain integrability
conditions, that are more restrictive than those for the pure Poisson setting and which
are due to the unbounded variation of Brownian motion. Here, we refer to Øksendal and
Sulem (2005, Theorem 3.1) who presents a suﬃciency result in case of controlled Le´vy
type processes.
As an illustration of the proofs and results presented in this paper, the accompanying
paper by Sennewald and Wa¨lde (2006) provides various examples, among them the opti-
mum consumption and investment problem stated above. A reader that is not interested
in the proofs can directly refer to this paper and use it as a toolbox for own modeling.
The organization of this paper is as follows. The subsequent section gives some general
assumptions and definitions concerning the formal background. In Section 3 we establish
the control problem with the necessary assumptions. Then, Section 4 provides the CVF
and useful properties of the controlled state process and the value function. Section 5
is devoted to the main results of the paper, the HJB equation as optimality criterion.
Subsequently, in Section 6, we present the extension to the Poisson-diﬀusion setup. The
proofs are given in Section 7, and the last section, finally, concludes.
2. General definitions and assumptions
Let (Ω,F , P ) be a probability space with filtration {Ft, t ≥ 0}. Let {Xt (ω) , t ≥ s}
be a n-dimensional adapted stochastic process starting at time s ≥ 0 and with ca´dla´g
paths. Throughout the paper we suppress the stochastic argument ω, and we write
5Recall that for general Markov processes Fleming and Soner (1993) assumed the value function to
be in the domain of the infinitesimal generator as well as the validity of the Dynkin formula. Only, in
case of controlled diﬀusion processes, they relax these assumptions, but still require the value function
to be polynomially bounded.
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shortly X for {Xt (ω) , t ≥ s} whenever there is no risk of confusion. The left limit at
time t, limτ%tXτ , is denoted by Xt−, where Xs− := 0. Trivially, Xt− coincides with Xt if
X possesses continuous paths. In the following the expression ca´dla´g is also used for any
real-valued function g (x) that is continuous from the right with left limits in its argument
x. If g : Rn → Rm, n,m ∈ N, is such a ca´dla´g function, and the process X adapted and
ca´dla´g, the process g (X) becomes adapted and ca´dla´g, too, and we denote the left limit
in t, limτ%t g (Xτ), by g (Xt)−. Then, if g is continuous, g (Xt)− = g(Xt−).
For vectors x, y ∈ Rn and a matrix M ∈ R(n,m), x · y stands for the standard scalar
product and kxk and kMk for the Euclidean norm. Ck denotes the space of k-times
continuously diﬀerentiable functions. If f ∈ C1 : (0,∞)×Rn, y = (t, x) 7→ f (y) = f (t, x),
then ft stands for the partial derivative with respect to t and fx and fy for the gradients
with respect to x and y, respectively. If f ∈ C2, fxx and fyy denote the Hesse matrices
with respect to x and y, respectively.
3. The control problem
Let C be a r-dimensional adapted ca´dla´g process and N1, ..., Nd independent adapted
Poisson processes with arrival rates λ1, . . . , λd. Then the n-dimensional state process X
controlled by the process C and starting at time s in point x ∈ Rn is supposed to obey
a SDE of the form
Xt = x+
R t
s α (τ ,Xτ , Cτ) dτ +
dP
k=1
R t
s βk(τ ,Xτ− , Cτ−)dN
k
τ ,
6 (2)
with continuous coeﬃcient functions α, β1, . . . , βd : [0,∞)× Rn × Rr → Rn. Note that,
due to the continuity, we can write βk(τ ,Xτ− , Cτ−) for βk(τ ,Xτ , Cτ)−, k = 1, . . . , d. The
coeﬃcient function α describes the time continuous evolution of the state process X,
whereas for each k = 1, . . . , d the function βk gives the magnitude of the jump in X
whenever Poisson process Nk jumps. Both the time continuous behavior and the jump
size are controlled by the choice of the control process C. In the following we always
assume that SDE (2) possesses a unique adapted solution XC,s,x. A detailed analysis of
6The n-dimensional stochastic integral is to be read componentwise. That is, for each k = 1, . . . , d,
R t
s βk(τ ,Xτ− , Cτ−)dN
k
τ =


R t
s β1k(τ ,Xτ− , Cτ−)dN
k
τ
...R t
s βnk(τ ,Xτ− , Cτ−)dN
k
τ

, with βik, i = 1, . . . , n being the components of
βk.
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SDEs with suﬃcient conditions for the existence of such a unique solution can be found
in, e.g., Garc´ıa and Griego (1994) and Protter (1995).
According to requirements in many economic models, we introduce a state space
constraint by assuming that X is allowed to lie only within a certain convex state space
Θ ⊂ Rn. We require furthermore that, if at time t state z ∈ Θ is observed, the control
at this time, Ct, can take only values in a certain convex control space Γt,z ⊂ Rr. Let
Γ := ∪(t,z)∈[0,∞)×ΘΓt,z be the union of all possible control spaces. A control C with
Ct ∈ Γt,XC,s,xt for all t ≥ s and of which the corresponding state process X
C,s,x remains in
Θ is called admissible control.
Notice that in the economic literature SDEs appear often in diﬀerential notation. In
this somewhat shorter notation, SDE (2) reads
dXt = α (t,Xt, Ct) dt+
dX
k=1
βk
¡
t,Xt−, Ct−
¢
dNkt ,Xs = x.
This expression might appear more intuitive since it seems to show more clearly what the
(infinitesimal) change of X at time t is driven by. Nevertheless, the diﬀerential notation is
only an “abbreviation” of the integral form, and both notations have the same meaning.
Throughout this paper, we shall always use the integral notation.
Let u : [0,∞)×Θ×Γ→ R (the “instantaneous utility function”) and ρ : [0,∞)→ R+
(the “time preference rate”) be continuous functions. Suppose that for all admissible
controls,
Es
R∞
s e
−
R t
s
ρ(τ)dτ
¯¯¯
u
³
t,XC,s,xt , Ct
´¯¯¯
dt <∞, (3)
where Es denotes the expectation conditional on Fs. Then the objective is to find an
admissible control that maximizes the performance criterion (“expected lifetime utility”)7
WC(s, x) := Es
R∞
s e
−
R t
s
ρ(τ)dτu
³
t,XC,s,xt , Ct
´
dt. (4)
Such a control is called optimal control for the starting point (s, x). Being a function of
the initial point (s, x) ∈ [0,∞)×Θ, WC is also called performance function.
There exist various types of controls that may be considered. Following Øksendal
(2003), these are, e.g.,
7In some cases one may wish to minimize WC , for example, if u stands for a cost rate. Then one
can equivalently maximize −WC , where u in (4) is replaced with −u, and the following still applies.
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• Feedback or closed loop controls, which are adapted to the Filtration {Mt, t ≥ s}
whereMt denotes the σ-algebra generated by
©
Xs,x,Cτ , s ≤ τ ≤ t
ª
. That is, the
choice of the control value at time t depends on the whole history of Xs,x,Ct .
• Deterministic or open loop controls, which do not depend on ω.
• Markov controls, whose value at time t is given as a function of current time and
state. That is, Ct (ω) = φ(t,X
s,x,C
t (ω)) for some function φ : [0,∞)×Rn → Rr.
In that case the corresponding state process Xs,x,Ct is Markovian.
In applied optimization problems, Markov controls present the most practical class of
controls since they “say clearly” what to do if at a certain time a certain state is observed.
Moreover, the HJB equation provides a powerful tool to characterize and verify optimal
Markov controls, as we shall see in Theorems 3 and 4. It even turns out that, under
very mild assumptions, one obtains as good a performance with a Markov control as
with any other admissible control, see Theorem 5. Hence, it is justified if we work in our
analysis with Markov controls only.8 The following definitions give the necessary tools to
formulate our control problem precisely:
(i) A ca´dla´g function φ : [0,∞) × Rn → Γ, (t, z) 7−→ φ(t, z) is called a policy. If
X is an adapted ca´dla´g process, a Markov control Cφ induced by a policy φ via
Cφt := φ (t,Xt) is adapted and ca´dla´g, too. Observe that in this case the integrals
in the controlled SDE (2) are well-defined. For SDE (2) we write then
Xt = x+
R t
s α
φ (τ ,Xτ ) ds+
dP
k=1
R t
s β
φ
k(τ ,Xτ)−dN
k
τ , (5)
where αφ(t, z) := α(t, z, φ (t, z)) and βφk(t, z) := βk(t, z, φ (t, z)). The unique
solution is denoted by Xφ,s,x. Furthermore, the performance function, defined
according to (4), is indicated by the superscript φ (instead of C) and reads
with uφ (t, z) := u (t, z, φ (t, z)) and ρs (t) :=
1
t−s
R t
s ρ (τ) dτ (the “average time
preference rate” from s to t):
W φ(s, x) = Es
R∞
s e
−ρs(t)(t−s)uφ
³
t,Xφ,s,xt
´
dt. (6)
(ii) A policy φ is called admissible if φ (t, z) ∈ Γt,z for all (t, z) ∈ [0,∞)×Θ and if for
any starting point (s, x) ∈ [0,∞)×Θ the controlled process Xφ,s,x never leaves
Θ, i.e., Xφ,s,xt ∈ Θ for all t ≥ s. The space of admissible policies is denoted by
Π.
8Restricting ourselves only to deterministic controls is clearly not suﬃcient since in a stochastic
environment it is not likely that a deterministic control is optimal.
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(iii) If the supremum is finite for all (s, x) ∈ [0,∞) × Θ, we call the function V :
[0,∞)×Θ→ R given by
V (s, x) := sup
φ∈Π
W φ(s, x) (7)
the value function.
(iv) An admissible policy φ∗ ∈ Π is called optimal policy if its performance function
is equal to the value function (7). That is, W φ
∗
(s, x) = V (s, x) for all (s, x) ∈
[0,∞) × Θ. Notice that the function φ∗ does not depend on the initial point
(s, x).
The control problem consists in finding an optimal admissible policy and can be
tackled with the HJB equation. As mentioned in the introductory section, we do not
limit ourselves to a bounded utility function or to bounded coeﬃcients in order to ensure
applicability for more general setups. Nevertheless, to show the necessity of the HJB
equation for optimality in Theorem 3 we assume the following conditions to be satisfied.
For the suﬃciency part in Theorem 4 they are not required.
(H1) We say that u satisfies a linear boundedness condition if there exists a constant
µ > 0 such that for all (t, z) ∈ [0,∞)×Θ and c ∈ Γt,z,
|u (t, z, c)| ≤ µ [kzk+ kck+ 1] . (8)
(H2) If existing, an optimal policy φ∗ is said to be linearly bounded if there exists a
constant γ ≥ 0 such that for all (t, z) ∈ [0,∞)×Θ
kφ∗ (t, z)k ≤ γ [kzk+ 1] . (9)
(H3) We say that a coeﬃcient function g ∈ {α, β1, . . . , βd} satisfies a linear growth
condition if for any admissible policy φ boundedness coeﬃcients pg (t) ≥ 0 and
qg (t) ≥ 0 exist for each t ≥ 0 such that for all z ∈ Θ,°°gφ (t, z)°° ≤ pg (t) kzk+ qg (t) , (10)
and the mappings t 7→ pg (t) and t 7→ qg (t) are ca´dla´g. Notice that this condition
holds uniformly over the set of admissible policies.
(H4) Define for any s ∈ [0,∞)
Ps (t) :=
1
t− s
R t
s
µ
pα (τ) +
dP
k=1
λkpβk (τ)
¶
dτ, t ≥ s, (11)
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and
Qs (t) :=
R t
s e
−Ps(τ)(τ−s)
µ
qα (τ) +
dP
k=1
λkqβk (τ)
¶
dτ, t ≥ s. (12)
If for some g ∈ {α, β1, . . . , βd} there exists a t∗ ≥ 0 with qg (t∗) > 0, the right
continuity of qg implies that Q0 (t) > 0 for all t > t∗, and we say that the
regularity condition is satisfied if
B :=
R∞
0
e−[ρ0(t)−P0(t)]tQ0 (t) dt <∞. (13)
If, in contrast, in the degenerated case, for each g ∈ {α, β1, . . . , βd} the bound-
edness coeﬃcient qg (t) is equal to 0 for all t ≥ 0 , then Q0 (t) = 0 and the
regularity condition is said to be satisfied if
A :=
R∞
0
e−[ρ0(t)−P0(t)]tdt <∞. (14)
Let us give a quick preview of the results presented in the subsequent sections in order
to explain why and where we shall use the conditions stipulated in (H1)-(H4). The linear
growth condition (10) gives an upper bound for the growth rate of the controlled process
Xφ,s,x. It allows to derive a finite upper bound for the expectation of Xφ,s,xt , which can
be expressed in terms of the initial state x, see Lemma 1. Regularity conditions (13) and
(14), respectively, make sure that the expected present value of the controlled process
is finite for any admissible policy φ, see Corollary 2. Then, together with the linear
boundedness conditions (8) and (9), we can deduce that the value function is linearly
bounded with respect to the initial state x, see Theorem 2. This result will be used
to show that the value function is in the domain of the infinitesimal generator of the
controlled process (see Lemma 3), which in turn is crucial for deriving the HJB equation
as a necessary criterion for optimality in Theorem 3.
The linear boundedness condition (8) is a substantial progress compared to the ab-
solute boundedness required in the literature. It is, for example, indispensable for the
CRRA utility function given in the example above.9 Assumption (9) is not very restric-
tive. In most applications such as, again, our example9 or models of exploiting renewable
resources, linear boundedness of the controls is even naturally implied. The linear growth
condition (10) is a common requirement in the theory of SDEs. It ensures that the solu-
tion Xφ,s,x does not explode. In addition, observe that (10) follows from another common
9For more details see Sennewald and Wa¨lde (2006, Subsection 3.2).
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assumption on SDEs, namely that the coeﬃcients satisfy a Lipschitz condition, which en-
sures the existence of a unique solution Xφ,s,s.10 Regularity conditions (13) and (14) are
easily met for suﬃciently high time preference rates, cf. also part (iii) of the following
remark.
Remark 1. (i) Condition (10) can be replaced by the following “easy-to-check” growth
condition: There exist ca´dla´g mappings pg (t) , p˜g (t) , qg (t) ≥ 0 such that kg (t, z, c)k ≤
pg (t) kzk+ p˜g (t) kck+ qg (t). Then (10) follows immediately with (9).
(ii) The following conclusion will be helpful for the proofs in Section 7. In the non-
degenerated case, where there exist some g ∈ {α, β1, . . . , βd} and t∗ > 0 with qg (t∗) > 0,
regularity condition (13) implies A < ∞, where A is defined as in (14). This result is
derived in appendix A.1. On the other hand, if qg (t) = 0 for all g and t, we obtain
immediately B = 0 and, by assumption, A < ∞. Thus, in either case we have A < ∞
and B <∞.
(iii) If the linear boundedness coeﬃcients qg and pg as well as the time preference rate ρ
are constants, regularity conditions (13) and (14) hold if and only if ρ > pα+
Pd
k=1 λkpβk .
4. Properties of the state process and the value function
This section serves as preparation for the derivation of the HJB equation as a necessary
and suﬃcient condition for optimality. It provides a CVF, the central tool in this paper,
and furthermore some useful properties of the controlled state process and the value
function if the assumptions (H1)-(H4) from the preceding section are met. The proofs
are given in Section 7. The CVF is presented in the following theorem. It can directly be
applied on multidimensional SDEs as given by (5) and allows to describe the evolution
of processes induced by a C1-mapping of the time-state process {(t,Xφ,s,xt ) : t ≥ s}.
Theorem 1. Let f : [0,∞) × Rn → R be a C1 - function. Then the process
{f(t,Xφ,s,xt ) : t ≥ s} is adapted and ca´dla´g, too, and it obeys11
f
³
t,Xφ,s,xt
´
= f (s, x) +
R t
s
£
ft
¡
τ ,Xφ,s,xτ
¢
+ αφ
¡
τ ,Xφ,s,xτ
¢ · fx ¡τ ,Xφ,s,xτ ¢¤ dτ
+
dP
k=1
R t
s
h
f
³
τ ,Xφ,s,xτ− + β
φ
k(τ ,X
φ,s,x
τ− )
´
− f
¡
τ ,Xφ,s,xτ−
¢i
dNkτ .
10For more details see, e.g., Garc´ıa and Griego (1994) or Gihman and Skorohod (1979, Ch. 3).
11Recall that the operator “·” denotes the standard scalar product.
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The following lemma shows that the expectation of ||Xφ,s,xt || is linearly bounded with
respect to the initial value x. This property holds uniformly over all admissible policies
φ ∈ Π.
Lemma 1. If the coeﬃcients α, β1, . . . , βd satisfy the linear growth condition (10),
then for all admissible policies φ ∈ Π,
Es
°°°Xφ,s,xt °°° ≤ ePs(t)(t−s) [kxk+Qs (t)] ,
where Ps (t) and Qs (t) are defined as in (11) and (12), respectively.
From Lemma 1 we deduce the following corollary.
Corollary 1. If the coeﬃcients α, β1, . . . , βd satisfy the linear growth condition (10),
then for all admissible policies φ ∈ Π,
Es sup
s≤τ≤t
°°Xφ,s,xτ °° ≤ ePs(t)(t−s) [kxk+Qs (t)] .
The next corollary shows that, for any admissible policy φ, the expected present
value of the controlled process Xφ,s,x discounted with the time preference rate is finite
and linearly bounded with respect to the initial state x.
Corollary 2. If the coeﬃcients α, β1, . . . , βd satisfy the linear growth condition (10)
such that regularity conditions (13) and (14), respectively, hold, then for all admissible
policies φ ∈ Π,
Es
R∞
s e
−ρs(t)(t−s)
°°°Xφ,s,xt °°° dt ≤ A (s) kxk+B (s) <∞,
where
A (s) :=
R∞
s e
−[ρs(t)−Ps(t)](t−s)dt (15)
and
B (s) :=
R∞
s e
−[ρs(t)−Ps(t)](t−s)Qs (t) dt, (16)
and Ps (t) and Qs (t) are defined as in (11) and (12), respectively.
If the utility function u is linearly bounded in the sense of (8), we derive the following
theorem from the preceding results. It shows that the value function, as well, is linearly
bounded with respect to the initial state x.
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Theorem 2. Suppose the utility function u satisfies the linear boundedness condition
(8) and the coeﬃcients α, β1, . . . , βd the linear growth condition (10) such that regularity
conditions (13) and (14), respectively, hold. In addition, let the optimal policy φ∗ be
linearly bounded according to (9). Then for all (s, x) ∈ [0,∞)×Θ,
|V (s, x)| ≤ (1 + γ)µA (s) kxk+K (s) <∞,
where A (s) is defined as in (15), and K (s) is a deterministic value that depends on the
boundedness coeﬃcients γ, µ, qg, and pg, where g ∈ {α, β1, . . . , βd}.
5. The Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation
This section presents the main results of the paper, the HJB equation as a necessary
and suﬃcient criterion for optimality. In order to achieve a shorter notation, we first
define the following diﬀerential operator D associated with the controlled SDE (5). For
a C1-function f : [0,∞)×Rn → R let D be given by
Dcf(s, x) := ft (s, x) + α(s, x, c) · fx(s, x) +
dP
k=1
λk[f(s, x+ βk(s, x, c))− f(s, x)]. (17)
Then the necessity part is presented in the following theorem.
Theorem 3. Assume that for any (s, x) ∈ [0,∞) × Θ and c ∈ Γs,x there exists
an admissible policy φ with φ (s, x) = c. Let the utility function u satisfy the linear
boundedness condition (8), and the coeﬃcients α, β1, . . . , βd the linear growth condition
(10) such that regularity conditions (13) and (14), respectively, hold. Assume that an
optimal policy φ∗ satisfying (9) exists. If furthermore the value function V is once con-
tinuously diﬀerentiable with bounded first derivatives, the following equation is satisfied
for all (s, x) ∈ [0,∞)×Θ:
ρ (s)V (s, x) = max
c∈Γs,x
{u(s, x, c) +DcV (s, x)} , (18)
and the maximum is achieved by φ∗ (s, x).
Equation (18) is called the HJB equation. Theorem 3 says that under the stipulated
conditions the HJB equation must be necessarily satisfied by the value function and the
optimal policy. Based on the fact that the optimal policy maximizes the right-hand side
of (18), we derive the following corollary.
Corollary 3. Let the conditions of Theorem 3 be satisfied, and let furthermore u be
diﬀerentiable with respect to c. Then, for all (s, x) ∈ [0,∞) × Θ for which φ∗ (s, x) lies
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in the interior of Γs,x, the following first-order condition holds:
∂
∂ci
u(s, x, φ∗ (s, x)) = − ∂
∂ci
Dφ
∗(s,x)V (s, x) , i = 1, . . . , r. (19)
If the value function and the optimal policy are unknown, equation (19) can be used for
further analysis. For example, starting from (19) it is possible to derive a Keynes-Ramsey
rule for optimum-consumption problems, see, e.g., Wa¨lde (1999) and the accompanying
paper Sennewald and Wa¨lde (2006) or, for the case of Brownian motion, Turnovsky
(2000). In some cases, one may even derive explicit expressions for candidates of both
the value function and the optimal policy, see also Sennewald and Wa¨lde (2006).
So far, we only know that the HJB equation is necessary. The subsequent theorem
shows that it is also a suﬃcient condition for optimality.
Theorem 4. Let a C1 - function J : [0,∞)×Θ→ R satisfy
ρ (s) J(s, x) ≥ u(s, x, c) +DcJ(s, x), ∀ (s, x) ∈ [0,∞)×Θ, ∀c ∈ Γs,x, (20)
and suppose in addition that there exists an admissible policy φ∗ such that
ρ (s) J(s, x) = uφ
∗
(s, x) +Dφ
∗(s,x)J(s, x), ∀ (s, x) ∈ [0,∞)×Θ. (21)
If furthermore for all (s, x) ∈ [0,∞)×Θ the limiting condition
lim
t→∞
E
h
e−ρs(t)tJ(t,Xφ
∗,s,x
t )
i
= 0 (22)
and the limiting inequality
lim
t→∞
E
h
e−ρs(t)tJ(t,Xφ,s,xt )
i
≥ 0, ∀φ ∈ Π, (23)
are satisfied, then J is the value function V and the policy φ∗ is optimal.
The HJB equation from Theorem 3 is divided here into inequality (20) and equation
(21). The theorem tells us that, if there exist a C1-function and a policy such that this
policy maximizes the HJB equation and terminal conditions (22) and (23) are satisfied,
then this policy is optimal and the function is the value function. Thus, one can use
Theorem 4 to verify whether a given function and a given policy (which were, for example,
found by “guessing” or via the first-order conditions in Corollary 3)12 coincide with the
value function and the optimal policy. Such theorems are therefore also called verification
12The method of “guessing” the value function and then verifying it has first been applied by Merton
(1971). He showed that, if the utility function u is of the HARA class, the value function can easily be
guessed as it is of similar form as u.
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theorems. Notice that the conditions in Theorem 4 are much milder than for the necessity
part in Theorem 3. In particular, one can show that the linear boundedness and growth
conditions (8), (9), and (10) together with regularity conditions (13) and (14) are suﬃcient
for both terminal conditions (22) and (23) to be satisfied.
Limiting condition (22) generalizes the boundary condition for finite time horizon
settings, see, e.g., Kushner and Dupuis (1992). In a deterministic framework, Michel
(1982) and later Kamihigashi (2001) show that such terminal (or transversality) condi-
tions may even be necessary conditions. In many control problems, the utility function u
is assumed to be nonnegative, for example, if u (c) = cσ, σ > 0. Then limiting inequality
(23) holds obviously since only candidates J for the value function with J(s, x) ≥ 0 for
all (s, x) ∈ [0,∞)×Θ are sensible.
The following corollary shows that, under certain conditions and making use of the
fact that a concave function can have only a unique maximum point, the verification can
be carried out quite easily.
Corollary 4. Let the instantaneous utility function u be nonnegative as well as
strictly concave and diﬀerentiable in the control variable c. Assume furthermore that
also the coeﬃcients α, β1, . . . , βd are concave in c.
13 Then, if a concave C1 - function
J : [0,∞)×Θ→ R and an admissible policy φ∗ satisfy equation (21) and the first-order
condition
∂
∂ci
u(s, x, φ∗ (s, x)) = − ∂
∂ci
Dφ
∗(s,x)J (s, x) , i = 1, . . . , r, (24)
and if furthermore limiting condition (22) holds, φ∗ is an optimal policy and J is the
value function V .
The following theorem tells us that an optimal Markov control is even optimal within
the class of general admissible controls under very mild assumptions.
Theorem 5. Suppose that an optimal Markov policy φ∗ exists and assume the value
function V to be once continuously diﬀerentiable and to satisfy
ρ (s)V (s, x) ≥ u(s, x, c) +DcV (s, x), ∀ (s, x) ∈ [0,∞)×Θ,∀c ∈ Γs,x. (25)
Furthermore, let the following limiting inequality hold for all admissible controls C:
lim
t→∞
Es
h
e−ρs(t)tV (t,XC,s,xt )
i
≥ 0. (26)
13Note that α, β1, . . . , βd can be linear in the control variable as well, cf. budget constraint (1).
18 CHAPTER 1. CONTROLLED STOCHASTIC DIFFERENTIAL EQUATIONS
Define the supremum of the performance function over all general admissible controls
C by V a (s, x) := sup{C adm. control}W
C (s, x). Then, V (s, x) = V a (s, x) for all (s, x) ∈
[0,∞)×Θ.
The result in Theorem 5 is not surprising since the “implicit” Markov nature of the
controlled SDE (2) suggests that Markov controls represent, so to speak, the natural class
of controls, and no wider class has to be taken into account. Note that the HJB equation
is suﬃcient for inequality (25) to be satisfied. That is, under the conditions of Theorems
3 and 4, inequality (25) holds and only limiting condition (26) has to be checked.
6. The Poisson-diﬀusion setting
In the following we show that the necessity property of the HJB equation extends
to the Poisson-diﬀusion case under the same mild conditions as before. Let B1, . . . , Bd˜
be d˜ independent standard Brownian motions that are also independent of the Poisson
processes. The controlled process Xφ,s,xt is now given as the solution of
Xt = x+
R t
s α
φ (τ ,Xτ ) ds+
d˜P
l=1
R t
s σ
φ
l (τ ,Xτ )dB
l
τ +
dP
k=1
R t
s β
φ
k(τ ,Xτ)−dN
k
τ , (27)
where for each l = 1, . . . , d˜ the diﬀusion coeﬃcient σφl (t, x) := σl(t, x, φ (t, x)) is defined
by a continuous vector function σl : [0,∞)×Rn×Rr → Rn.14 The diﬀerential operator D˜
corresponding to the controlled SDE (27) applies to C1,2 - functions f : [0,∞)×Rn → R
and reads
D˜cf(s, x) : = ft (s, x) + α(s, x, c) · fx(s, x) + 1
2
d˜P
l=1
σl(s, x, c)
0fxx (s, x)σl(s, x, c)
+
dP
k=1
λk[f(s, x+ βk(s, x, c))− f(s, x)]. (28)
Then the necessity of the HJB equation analogous to Theorem 3 is stated in the following
theorem.
Theorem 6. Assume the conditions from Theorem 3 to be satisfied. In addition let
the diﬀusion coeﬃcients σφ1 , . . . , σ
φ
d˜
be linearly bounded in the sense of (10), i.e.,°°°σφl (t, x)°°° ≤ pσl (t) kxk+ qσl (t) . (29)
14As the jump integral, the n-dimensional diﬀusion integral is to be read componentwise.
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If then the value function V is twice continuously diﬀerentiable with bounded Hesse matrix
Vyy, the following equation is satisfied for all (s, x) ∈ [0,∞)×Θ:
ρ (s)V (s, x) = max
c∈Γs,x
n
u(s, x, c) + D˜cV (s, x)
o
, (30)
where the maximum is achieved by the optimal policy φ∗ (s, x).
The proof is in analogy to the proof of Theorem 3. Appendix A.2 shows where and
how to make the necessary adjustments.
7. Proof of results
This part presents the proofs for the findings from Sections 4 and 5. Before starting,
we repeat a crucial property of the stochastic integral with respect to Poisson processes. It
is due to the fact that Poisson processes are of bounded variation. We are given a Poisson
process N with arrival rate λ and a ca´dla´g process X. Both processes are adapted. Then,
according to Garc´ıa and Griego (1994, Section 3), the following relation holds true for
any 0 ≤ ν ≤ s < t:
Eν
hR t
sXτ−dNτ
i
= λEν
hR t
sXτdτ
i
. (31)
For the reader’s convenience we recall the following result from real analysis. It can
be proven using the (ε, δ) - definition of continuity at point t. A proof can be found in
many textbooks on real analysis as in, e.g., Browder (1996).
Lemma 2. Let the function f : [0,∞)→ R be integrable and right continuous at point
t ∈ [0,∞). Then,
lim
h&0
1
h
R t+h
t f(τ)dτ = f(t).
We now turn to the proofs. Theorem 1 is derived from Garcia and Griego’s (1994)
CVF on p. 344. The necessary assumptions (Xφ,s,x is ca´dla´g and the stochastic integrals
in (5) are in the Lebesgue-Stieltjes sense) are obviously met. Lemma 1, which shows
that the expectation of ||Xφ,s,xt || is linearly bounded with respect to the initial state x, is
proven as follows.
Proof of Lemma 1. Using a comparison principle as, e.g., Bassan et al. (1993,
Corollary 3.5), we deduce from the linear growth condition (10) that
°°°Xφ,s,xt °°° ≤ Zs,xt ,
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where Zs,xt denotes the unique solution of
15
Zt = kxk+
R t
s [pα (τ)Zτ + qα (τ)] dτ +
dP
k=1
R t
s
£
pβk (τ−)Zτ− + qβk (τ−)
¤
dNkτ . (32)
Hence,
Es
°°°Xφ,s,xt °°° ≤ EsZs,xt . (33)
We now compute EsZ
s,x
t . Taking expectation on SDE (32) and using (31) yields
EsZ
s,x
t = kxk+Es
R t
s
·
pα (τ)Zτ + qα (τ) +
dP
k=1
λk
£
pβk (τ)Zτ + qβk (τ)
¤¸
dτ. (34)
Interchanging expectation and integral due to the theorem of bounded convergence leads
to16
EsZ
s,x
t = kxk+
R t
s
·µ
pα (τ) +
dP
k=1
λkpβk (τ)
¶
EsZs,xτ + qα (τ) +
dP
k=1
λkqβk (τ)
¸
dτ.
This deterministic linear diﬀerential equation in EsZ
s,x
t has the unique solution
EsZ
s,x
t = e
Ps(t)(t−s) [kxk+Qs (t)] , (35)
where Ps (t) and Qs (t) are defined as in (11) and (12), respectively. This relation together
with (33) finishes the proof. ¤
The preceding proof immediately implies the subsequent proof of Corollary 1.
Proof of Corollary 1. Since the boundedness coeﬃcients pg and qg, g ∈ {α, β1,
. . . , βd}, are nonnegative, Zs,x has increasing paths. Remember from the proof of Lemma
1 that
°°°Xφ,s,xt °°° ≤ Zs,xt for all t ≥ s. Thus, sups≤τ≤t °°Xφ,s,xτ °° ≤ sups≤τ≤t Zs,xτ = Zs,xt and
hence, Es sups≤τ≤t
°°Xφ,s,xτ °° ≤ EsZs,xt , which together with (35) yields Corollary 1. ¤
Proof of Corollary 2. From the proof of Lemma 1 we know that
°°°Xφ,s,xt °°° ≤
Zs,xt . Thus,
Es
R∞
s e
−ρs(t)(t−s)
°°°Xφ,s,xt °°° dt ≤ Es R∞s e−ρs(t)(t−s)Zs,xt dt. (36)
Using (35) and assuming for the moment that A (s) and B (s) defined as in (15) and
(16), respectively, are finite, we can now apply the theorems of bounded and monotone
15Using Protter (1990, theorem V.6), one can show easily that (32) possess a unique solution with
finite expectation.
16See Appendix A.3 to see how to use the theorem of bounded convergence in this case.
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convergence in order to interchange expectation and integral on the right-hand side of
(36),17 which yields
Es
R∞
s e
−ρs(t)(t−s)
°°°Xφ,s,xt °°° dt ≤ A (s) kxk+B (s) . (37)
It remains to be shown that A (s) and B (s) are finite. For this purpose we use that
A (s) ≤ e[ρ0(s)−P0(s)]sA (38)
and
B (s) ≤ e[ρ0(s)−P0(s)]sB. (39)
But since we know from Remark 1 (ii) that due to regularity conditions (13) and (14),
respectively, A and B are always finite, the result follows. ¤
We proceed with the proof of Theorem 2, which shows that the value function is
linearly bounded with respect to the initial value x.
Proof of Theorem 2. Using the linear boundedness conditions (8) and (9), we
find the following upper bound for the value function:
|V (s, x)| = ¯¯W φ∗(s, x)¯¯ ≤ Es R∞s e−ρs(t)(t−s) ¯¯¯uφ∗ ³t,Xφ∗,s,xt ´¯¯¯ dt
≤ µEs
R∞
s e
−ρs(t)(t−s)
h°°°Xφ∗,s,xt °°°+ °°°φ∗ ³Xφ∗,s,xt ´°°°+ 1i dt
≤ (1 + γ)µ
·
Es
R∞
s e
−ρs(t)(t−s)
°°°Xφ∗,s,xt °°° dt+ Z ∞
s
e−ρs(t)(t−s)dt
¸
. (40)
Since A (s) is an upper bound for
R∞
s e
−ρs(t)(t−s)dt and A (s) is finite according to (38) and
Remark 1 (ii), the second term in brackets on the right-hand side is finite, too. The first
term is finite according to Corollary 2. Hence, setting K (s) := (1 + γ)µ[
R∞
s e
−ρs(t)(t−s)dt
+B (s)], we finally obtain K (s) <∞ and hence |V (s, x)| ≤ (1 + γ)µA (s) kxk+K (s) <
∞, which is what was to be shown. ¤
In order to simplify the notation in the following, we drop the explicit time argument
by introducing the time-state processn
Y φ,yt =
³
s+ t,Xφ,s,xs+t
´
, t ≥ 0
o
, Y φ,y0 := y := (s, x) . (41)
Then the state space corresponding to this process is Θ˜ := [0,∞)×Θ ⊂ Rn+1, and Y φ,y
solves the transformed SDE
Yt = y +
R t
0
α˜φ (Yτ) dτ +
dP
k=1
R t
0
β˜
φ
k (Yτ)− dN˜
k
τ , (42)
17See Appendix A.4.
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where the coeﬃcients are given by α˜φ (t, z) :=
¡
1, αφ (t, z)
¢0
and β˜
φ
k (t, z) :=
³
0, βφk (t, z)
´0
,
and for each k = 1, . . . , d the process N˜k defined by N˜kτ := N
k
s+τ − Nks forms a Poisson
process. The corresponding filtration is
n
F˜t, t ≥ 0
o
, where F˜t := Fs+t. We rewrite the
performance function by time transformation as
W φ(y) = E˜0
R t
0
e−ρ˜s(t)tuφ
³
Y φ,yt
´
dt, (43)
where ρ˜s (t) :=
1
t
R t
0
ρ (s+ r) dr = ρs (s+ t), and E˜t denotes the conditional expectation
with respect to F˜t.
Altogether, by deriving (42) and (43), we have transformed the general control prob-
lem into a time-autonomous one. The corresponding diﬀerential operator D is the same
as in (17) and reads, adapted to the time-autonomous setup,
Dcf(y) = α˜(y, c) · fy(y) +
dP
k=1
λk[f(y + β˜k(y, c))− f(y)]. (44)
The following lemma shows that the value function V belongs to the domain of the
infinitesimal generator of the controlled process Xφ,s,x for any admissible policy φ. This
result is crucial for deriving the necessity of the HJB equation in Theorem 3. Whereas
the proof is almost trivial if utility (or value function)18 and the coeﬃcients are bounded,
it becomes more complex for the more general case with linearly bounded utility and
coeﬃcient functions.
Lemma 3. Under the conditions of Theorem 3 we obtain for any admissible policy φ,
lim
h&0
1
h
E˜0
h
e−ρ˜s(h)hV (Y φ,yh )− V (y)
i
= Dφ(y)V (y)− ρ (s)V (y).
Proof. Applying the CVF from Theorem 1 to the C1 - function f (v) = f (t, z) =
e−ρ˜s(t)tV (v) yields
e−ρ˜s(h)(h)V
³
Y φ,yh
´
− V (y)
=
R h
0
£
α˜φ
¡
Y φ,yτ
¢ · e−ρ˜s(τ)τVy ¡Y φ,yτ ¢− ρ (s+ τ) e−ρ˜s(τ)τV (Y φ,yτ )¤ dτ
+
dP
k=1
R h
0
h
e−ρ˜s(τ)τV
³
Y φ,yτ− + β˜
φ
k
¡
Y φ,yτ
¢
−
´
− e−ρ˜s(τ)τV (Y φ,yτ− )
i
dN˜kτ .
18As one can show easily, a bounded utility function implies that the value function is bounded as
well.
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Taking expectation and dividing by h gives, together with (31),
1
h
E˜0
h
e−ρ˜s(h)hV (Y φ,yh )− V (y)
i
= E˜0
½
1
h
R h
0
e−ρ˜s(τ)τ
£
α˜φ
¡
Y φ,yτ
¢ · Vy ¡Y φ,yτ ¢− ρ (s+ τ)V (Y φ,yτ )¤ dτ¾
+
dP
k=1
λkE˜0
½
1
h
R h
0
e−ρ˜s(τ)τ
h
V
³
Y φ,yτ + β˜
φ
k
¡
Y φ,yτ
¢´
− V (Y φ,yτ )
i
dτ
¾
. (45)
Now let h tend to 0. We show that the theorem of bounded convergence can be applied
to interchange limit and expectation on the right-hand side in (45). For this purpose
we have to find an upper bound with finite expectation for each of the d + 1 random
variables inside the expectations. Notice that such a bound must hold uniformly over all
h that are small enough. Whereas the bound is obvious if the utility function and the
coeﬃcients are bounded, we have to do some more calculation for the more general case
with linear boundedness.
We first consider the most-left integral on the right-hand side of (45). Remember
from real analysis that for any univariate piecewise continuous function f ,
R y
x f (z) dz ≤
(y − x)maxx≤z≤y f (z). According to this result we derive for h ≤ 1, using the linear
boundedness of αφ, the linear boundedness of V according to Theorem 2, and the bound-
edness of the first derivative of V :¯¯¯¯
1
h
R h
0
e−ρ˜s(τ)τ
£
α˜φ
¡
Y φ,yτ
¢ · Vy ¡Y φ,yτ ¢− ρ (s+ τ)V (Y φ,yτ )¤ dτ ¯¯¯¯
≤ [kpαk1 kVyk+ (1 + γ)µ kρk1 kAk1] sup
τ∈[0,1]
°°°Xφ,s,xs+τ °°°+ (1 + kqαk1) kVyk+ kρk1 kKk1
where, by assumption, kVyk := supy∈Θ˜ kVy (y)k <∞ and, due to their ca´dla´g property (re-
spective continuity), kpαk1 := supτ∈[0,1] pα (s+ τ) <∞, kAk1 := supτ∈[0,1]A (s+ τ) <∞,
and so forth. According to Corollary 1, supτ∈[0,1]
°°°Xφ,s,xs+τ °°° possesses finite expectation.
Hence, the right-hand side in the latter inequality is an upper bound with finite expec-
tation for the first integral on the right-hand side in (45). In analogy, for each of the
remaining k integrals in (45) an upper bound for all h ≤ 1 is given by¯¯¯¯
1
h
R h
0
e−ρ˜s(τ)τ
h
V
³
Y φ,yτ + β˜
φ
k
¡
Y φ,yτ
¢´
− V (Y φ,yτ )
i
dτ
¯¯¯¯
≤ (1 + γ)µ kAk1
¡
2 +
°°pβk°°1¢ sup
τ∈[0,1]
°°°Xφ,s,xs+τ °°°+ (1 + γ)µ kAk1 °°qβk°°1 + 2 kKk1
Again with Lemma 1 we deduce that the expectation of this upper bound is finite. The
theorem of bounded convergence can hence be applied on (45), and interchanging limit
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and expectation finally yields jointly with Lemma 2
lim
h&0
1
h
E˜0
h
e−ρ˜s(h)hV (Y φ,yh )− V (y)
i
= α˜φ (y) · Vy (y)− ρ (s)V (y) +
dP
k=1
λk
³
V
³
y + β˜
φ
k (y)
´
− V (y)
´
= Dφ(y)V (y)− ρ (s)V (y),
which is what was to be shown. ¤
In the remaining part of this section we finally present the proofs of the main results
from Section 5.
Proof of Theorem 3. Let y ∈ Θ˜. We first prove that the optimal policy φ∗ yields
equality in the HJB equation (18). For some small h > 0 we obtain, cf. also Fleming and
Soner (1993) or Kushner and Dupuis (1992),
0 = E˜0
R∞
0
e−ρ˜s(t)tuφ
∗
³
Y φ
∗,y
t
´
dt− V (y)
= E˜0
R h
0
e−ρ˜s(t)tuφ
∗
³
Y φ
∗,y
t
´
dt+ E˜0
R∞
h e
−ρ˜s(t)tuφ
∗
³
Y φ
∗,y
t
´
dt− V (y)
= E˜0
R h
0
e−ρ˜s(t)tuφ
∗
³
Y φ
∗,y
t
´
dt
+E˜0
n
e−ρ˜s(h)hE
hR∞
0
e−ρ˜s+h(t)tuφ
∗
³
Y φ
∗,y
h+t
´
dt
¯¯¯
Y φ
∗,y
h
io
− V (y)
= E˜0
R h
0
e−ρ˜s(t)tuφ
∗
³
Y φ
∗,y
t
´
dt+ E˜0
h
e−ρ˜s(h)hV (Y φ
∗,y
h )− V (y)
i
. (46)
Dividing by h and applying the limit h& 0, this becomes
0 = lim
h&0
E˜0
1
h
R h
0
e−ρ˜s(t)tuφ
∗
³
Y φ
∗,y
t
´
dt+ lim
h&0
E˜0
1
h
h
e−ρ˜s(h)hV (Y φ
∗,y
h )− V (y)
i
.
For the first term we use in analogy to appendix A.3 the theorem of bounded convergence
to interchange expectation and integral.19 Then, we obtain with Lemma 2,
lim
h&0
E˜0
1
h
R h
0
e−ρ˜s(t)tuφ
∗
³
Y φ
∗,y
t
´
dt = uφ
∗
(y) .
For the second term, Lemma 3 gives the limit. Thus, altogether, 0 = uφ
∗
(y)+Dφ
∗(y)V (y)−
ρ (s)V (y), which shows that equality in (18) is satisfied for the optimal policy.
It remains to be shown that for any c ∈ Γy, ρ (s)V (y) ≥ u(y, c) +DcV (y). For this
purpose we follow an argument applied by Kushner and Dupuis (1992) and Duﬃe (1992),
19An upper bound is
R∞
0
e−ρ˜s(t)t
¯¯¯
uφ
∗
³
Y φ
∗,y
t
´¯¯¯
dt, which possess finite expectation due to assumption
(3).
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in defining a policy
ψy,h (v) :=
(
φ (v) for s ≤ t < s+ h
φ∗ (v) for t ≥ s+ h
, v = (t, z) ∈ Φ˜,
where φ is an arbitrary admissible policy with φ (y) = c.20 Since from time s+ h on the
policies ψy,h and φ
∗ equal each other, we obtain
Wψy,h(Y
ψy,h,y
t ) =W
φ∗(Y
ψy,h,y
t ) = V (Y
ψy,h,y
t ), ∀t ≥ h.
Then in analogy to (46),
0 ≥Wψy,h(y)− V (y) = E˜0
R h
0
e−ρ˜s(t)tuφ(Y φ,yt )dt+ E˜0
h
e−ρ˜s(h)hV (Y φ,yh )− V (y)
i
.
Now, if we divide by h and let h tend toward 0, we obtain
0 ≥ lim
h&0
E˜0
1
h
R h
0
e−ρ˜s(t)tuφ(Y φ,yt )dt+ lim
h&0
1
h
E˜0
h
e−ρ˜s(h)hV (Y φ
∗,y
h )− V (y)
i
.
Again, the limit of the first term is derived by first interchanging expectation and integral
according to the theorem of bounded convergence and then by applying Lemma 2, whereas
Lemma 3 gives the second limit. Hence, 0 ≥ u(y, c) +DcV (y)− ρ (s)V (y). Since c ∈ Γy
was chosen arbitrarily, the proof is completed. ¤
Proof of Corollary 3. Let y ∈ Θ˜. Since according to Theorem 3, uφ∗(y) +
Dφ
∗(y)V (y) ≥ u(y, c) +DcV (y) for all c ∈ Γy, (19) must hold as a first order condition if
φ∗ (y) lies in the interior of Γy. ¤
Proof of Theorem 4. We have a continuously diﬀerentiable function J : Θ˜ → R
that satisfies inequality (20) and, with an admissible policy φ∗, equation (21). We show
(i) J(y) ≥ W φ(y) for any arbitrary admissible policy φ and (ii) J(y) = W φ∗(y), which
implies that φ∗ is an optimal policy and that J =W φ
∗
is the value function V .
Step (i): Let φ ∈ Π be an arbitrary admissible policy. Then inequality (20) gives
−ρ (s)J(y) +Dφ(y)J(y) ≤ −uφ(y), ∀y ∈ Θ˜. (47)
Applying the change of variables formula from Theorem 1 to the C1 - function f (v) =
f (t, z) = e−ρ˜s(t)tJ(v) and taking the expectation on both sides yields together with (31)
the following version of the Dynkin formula:
E˜0e−ρ˜s(t)tJ(Y
φ,y
t )− J(y) = E˜0
R t
0
e−ρ˜s(τ)τ
h
−ρ (s+ τ)J(Y φ,yτ ) +Dφ(Y
φ,y
τ )J(Y φ,yτ )
i
dτ.
20By assumption, there exists an admissible policy φ with φ (y) = c for any c ∈ Γy.
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Then, inequality (47) implies J(y) ≥ E˜0
R t
0
e−ρ˜s(τ)τuφ(Y φ,yτ )dτ+E˜0e
−ρ˜s(t)tJ(Y φ,yt ). Letting
t approach infinity and applying the theorem of bounded convergence on the first term
on the right-hand side gives J (y) ≥ W φ(y) + limt→∞ E˜0e−ρ˜s(t)tJ(Y φ,yt ).21 Thus, since by
assumption (23) the limit on the right-hand side is equal to or greater as 0, J(y) ≥W φ(y).
Step (ii): We may rewrite (21) as −ρ (s)J(y) + Dφ∗(y)J(y) = −uφ∗(y). Then, in
exactly the same way as in step (i), only with “=” instead of “≤”, we deduce that
J(y) = W φ
∗
(y) + limt→∞ E˜0e−ρ˜s(t)tJ(Y
φ∗,y
t ). Since by limiting condition (22) the right-
most term goes to zero, we obtain J(y) =W φ
∗
(y), which completes the proof. ¤
Proof of Corollary 4. We show that the conditions of Theorem 4 are satisfied.
Then, by Theorem 4, the result follows. At first we derive from the nonnegativity of
u that the value function V is nonnegative, too. Hence, limiting inequality (23) holds.
Thus, it remains to be shown that φ∗(y) is a global maximum point of u(y, c)+DcJ(y), or
uφ
∗
(y) +Dφ
∗(y)J(y) ≥ u(y, c) +DcJ(y) for all c ∈ Γy. The first order condition for φ∗ (y)
to be a local maximum point is satisfied by assumption (24). From the strict concavity
of u and V and the concavity of α, β1, . . . , βd we know that u(y, c) + D
cJ(y) is strictly
concave in c as well. Hence, φ∗ (y) is both a local and a global maximum point. ¤
Proof of Theorem 5. This proof is similar to the one presented in Øksendal (2003)
for controlled diﬀusion processes. In analogy to part (i) of the proof of Theorem 4, we
get for any admissible control C, V (y) ≥ WC (y) + limt→∞ e−ρ˜s(t)tE˜0J(Y C,yt ). According
to limiting inequality (26) the limit on the right-hand side is equal to or greater than
0. Thus, V (y) ≥ WC (y). Since the control C was chosen arbitrarily and the class
of Markov controls is included in the class of generalized admissible controls (and thus
V (y) ≤ V a (y)), the theorem follows. ¤
8. Conclusion
In a model of optimal control where the state variable is subject to random jumps
driven by one or more independent Poisson processes we have presented rigorous proofs for
both the necessity and the suﬃciency of the HJB equation under milder conditions than
before. We especially relax the assumption of bounded utility and coeﬃcient functions.
More precisely, it could be shown that the HJB equation is still a necessary condition
for optimality if these functions are linearly bounded. On the other hand, apart from a
21An upper bound with finite expectation is given by
R∞
0
e−ρ˜s(τ)τ
¯¯
uφ(Y φ,yτ )
¯¯
dτ .
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terminal condition, suﬃciency could be derived even without requiring any boundedness
condition at all.
Nevertheless, we required, at least in the necessity part, other underlying, extrinsic
conditions to be satisfied, namely (i) (implicitly) the expected present value of the state
process to be finite (see assumption (H4) and Lemma 1) and (ii) the value function to
be once continuously diﬀerentiable with bounded first derivatives. Relaxing these issues
is left for further research.
A. Appendix
A.1. Derivation of Remark 1 (ii). If there exist some g and t∗ with qg (t∗) > 0,
the ca´dla´g property of the boundedness coeﬃcient qg yields Q0 (t) > 0 for all t ≥ t∗.
Thus, for some T > t∗,
A ≤
R T
0
e−[ρ0(t)−P0(t)]tdt+
1
Q0 (T )
R∞
T e
−[ρ0(t)−P0(t)]tQ0 (t) dt ≤
R T
0
e−[ρ0(t)−P0(t)]tdt+
B
Q0 (T )
,
and hence, due to (13), A <∞.
A.2. The Poisson-diﬀusion setting - Proofs. In the present section we show
where and how the proofs from Section 7 have to be adjusted in order to prove Theorem 6.
First, we find that the assertions from the preparatory Section 4 carry over to the Poisson-
diﬀusion setup if the following modifications are carried out. The CVF corresponding to
the Poisson-diﬀusion SDE (27) reads as stated in the following theorem. It can be derived
by “translating” the generalized Itoˆ formula from Øksendal and Sulem (2005, Theorem
1.16) to the setup at hand.
Theorem 7. Let Xφ,s,xt obey SDE (27). For a C1,2 - function f : [0,∞) × Rn → R
the process {f(t,Xφ,s,xt ) : t ≥ s} is adapted and ca´dla´g and follows
f
³
t,Xφ,s,xt
´
= f (s, x) +
R t
s


ft
¡
τ ,Xφ,s,xτ
¢
+ αφ
¡
τ ,Xφ,s,xτ
¢ · fx ¡τ ,Xφ,s,xτ ¢
+1
2
d˜P
k=1
σφl (τ ,X
φ,s,x
τ )
0fxx
¡
τ ,Xφ,s,xτ
¢
σφl (τ ,X
φ,s,x
τ )

 dτ
+
d˜P
l=1
R t
s σ
φ
l (τ ,X
φ,s,x
τ ) · fx
¡
τ ,Xφ,s,xτ
¢
dBlτ
+
dP
k=1
R t
s
h
f
³
τ ,Xφ,s,xτ− + β
φ
k(τ ,X
φ,s,x
τ− )
´
− f
¡
τ ,Xφ,s,xτ−
¢i
dNkτ .
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In the proof of Lemma 1, SDE (32), now bounding (27), has to be changed to
Zt = kxk+
R t
s [pα (τ)Zτ + qα (τ)] dτ +
d˜P
l=1
R t
s [pσl (τ)Zτ + qσl (τ)] dB
l
τ
+
dP
k=1
R t
s
£
pβk (τ−)Zτ− + qβk (τ−)
¤
dNkτ . (48)
According to Øksendal and Sulem (2005, Theorem 1.19), this linear SDE possesses a
unique solution with finite second moment. Then, after taking expectation and using
the martingale property of the Brownian motion, we see that the proof and hence the
assertion of Lemma 1 remain unchanged. In the proof of Corollary 1 we find that Zs,xt
following (48) has still increasing paths since the boundedness coeﬃcients of the diﬀusion
components σl given by (29) are nonnegative. Thus Corollary 1 still holds true, as do
Corollary 2 and Theorem 2 whose proofs do not need to be altered at all.
We now turn to the proof of Theorem 6. The time-state process Y φ,yt from (41) obeys
here Y φ,yt = y +
R t
0
α˜φ
¡
Y φ,yτ
¢
dτ +
d˜P
l=1
R t
s σ˜
φ
l (Y
φ,y
τ )dB˜
l
τ +
dP
k=1
R t
0
β˜
φ
k
¡
Y φ,yτ
¢
− dN˜
k
τ , where for
each l = 1, . . . , d˜, σ˜φl (t, x) :=
³
0, σφl (t, x)
´0
and B˜lτ := B
l
s+τ − Bls is a Brownian motion
starting at s. The corresponding diﬀerential operator is given by D˜c in (28). If the
conditions from Theorem 6 are satisfied, Lemma 3 holds true with D˜c instead of Dc. For
its proof we now apply CVF from Theorem 7, and equation (45) changes to
1
h
E˜0
h
e−ρ˜s(h)(h)V
³
Y φ,yh
´
− V (y)
i
= E˜0
1
h
R h
0


αφ
¡
Y φ,yτ
¢ · e−ρ˜s(τ)τVy ¡Y φ,yτ ¢+ 12 d˜P
l=1
σ˜φl (Y
φ,y
τ )
0Vyy
¡
Y φ,yτ
¢
σ˜φl (Y
φ,y
τ )
−ρ (s+ τ) e−ρ˜s(τ)τV (Y φ,yτ )

 dτ
+
dP
k=1
λkE˜0
1
h
R h
0
h
e−ρ˜s(τ)τV
³
Y φ,yτ− + β
φ
k
¡
Y φ,yτ
¢
−
´
− e−ρ˜s(τ)τV (Y φ,yτ− )
i
dτ.
In order to be allowed to apply the theorem of bounded convergence we have to find an
upper bound with finite expectation for the additionally obtained diﬀusion term. Using
the linear boundedness (29) of the coeﬃcient σ, we arrive for each l = 1, . . . , d˜ at the
upper bound
1
h
R h
0
"
1
2
d˜P
l=1
σ˜φl (Y
φ,y
τ )
0Vyy
¡
Y φ,yτ
¢
σ˜φl (Y
φ,y
τ )
#
≤ sup
τ∈[0,1]
1
2
d˜P
l=1
°°°σ˜φl (Y φ,yτ )°°°2 kVyyk
≤ sup
τ∈[0,1]
1
2
kVyyk
d˜P
l=1
" °°p2σl°°1 supτ∈[0,1] °°Xφ,s,xτ °°2
+2 kpσlk1 kqσlk1 supτ∈[0,1]
°°Xφ,s,xτ °°+ °°q2σl°°1
#
, (49)
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where kpσlk1 := supτ∈[0,1] pσl (s+ τ) < ∞, kqσlk1 := supτ∈[0,1] qσl (s+ τ) < ∞ and, by
assumption, kVyyk := sup(t,z)∈[0,∞)×Θ kVyy (t, z)k < ∞. From Corollary 1 we know that
E0 supτ∈[0,1]
°°Xφ,s,xτ °° < ∞. Finiteness of E0 supτ∈[0,1] °°Xφ,s,xτ °°2 follows from
E0 supτ∈[0,1]
°°Xφ,s,xτ °°2 ≤ E0Z21 , which is according to the adapted proof of Corollary
1, and EsZ21 < ∞, as is mentioned above. The right-hand side in (49) is hence of finite
expectation and the theorem of bounded convergence can be applied. The remaining
part of this proof as well as the proof of Theorem 6 are then exactly as in the pure jump
setting. We only have to add, whenever it is necessary, the quadratic diﬀusion term,
which leads finally to D˜c instead of Dc.
A.3. Interchanging expectation and integral in (34). If we define the process
Hτ := pα (τ)Zτ + qα (τ) +
Pd
k=1 λk
£
pβk (τ)Zτ + qβk (τ)
¤
, (34) reads EsZ
s,x
t = kxk +
Es
R t
s Hτdτ . We may express the integral as a limit of Riemann sums by
R t
s Hτdτ =
lim∆→0∆
Pn∆−1
T=0 Hs+T , where ∆ is the length of the subintervals for an equidistant parti-
tion of the interval [s, t] and n∆ the number of these subintervals, i.e., ∆ ·n∆ = t−s. Now
the problem of interchanging expectation and integral has been converted into a problem
of interchanging expectation and limit. Here the theorem of bounded convergence comes
into play. We have to find an upper bound with finite expectation for the absolute value
of ∆
Pn∆−1
T=0 Hs+T that holds uniformly for all ∆ small enough. Since the boundedness
coeﬃcients pg and qg, g ∈ {α, β1, . . . , βd} are nonnegative, Zs,x is nonnegative, too, and
has increasing paths. Therefore,°°°°∆ n∆−1P
T=0
Hs+T
°°°° = ∆ n∆−1P
T=0
Hs+T
≤ (t− s)
·µ
kpαks,t +
dP
k=1
λk
°°pβk°°s,t¶Zs,xt + kqαks,t + dP
k=1
λk
°°qβk°°s,t¸ ,
where, for g = α, β1, . . . , βd, kpgks,t := sups≤τ≤t |pg (τ)| <∞ and kqgks,t := sups≤τ≤t |qg (τ)|
< ∞. Thus, since the right-hand side has clearly finite expectation, the theorem of
bounded convergence allows to interchange expectation and limit, and we obtain
EsZ
s,x
t = kxk+Es lim∆→0∆
n∆−1P
T=0
Hs+T = kxk+ lim∆→0∆
n∆−1P
T=0
EsHs+T = kxk+
R t
sEsHτdτ.
A.4. Interchanging expectation and integral in (36). Assuming A (s) and
B (s) to be finite, we show how the theorems of monotone and bounded convergence
can be used to interchange expectation and integral in Es
R∞
s e
−ρs(t)(t−s)Zs,xt dt. At first,
we consider the expectation of the finite horizon integral
R T
s e
−ρs(t)(t−s)Zs,xt dt. Here, in
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analogy to appendix A.3 and with the upper bound (T − s)Zs,xT , the theorem of bounded
convergence yields together with (35)
Es
R T
s e
−ρs(t)(t−s)Zs,xt dt =
R T
s e
−[ρs(t)−Ps(t)](t−s) [kxk+Qs (t)] dt. (50)
In the next step, we write
R∞
s e
−ρs(t)(t−s)Zs,xt dt = limT→∞
R T
s e
−ρs(t)(t−s)Zs,xt dt. SinceR T
s e
−ρs(t)(t−s)Zs,xt dt is increasing in T and since according to (50),
sup
T≥s
Es
R T
s e
−ρs(t)(t−s)Zs,xt dt =
R∞
s e
−[ρs(t)−Ps(t)](t−s) [kxk+Qs (t)] dt
= A (s) kxk+B (s) <∞,
the theorem of monotone convergence tells us that
R∞
s e
−ρs(t)(t−s)Zs,xt dt possesses finite
expectation and that
Es
R∞
s e
−ρs(t)(t−s)Zs,xt dt =
R∞
s e
−ρs(t)(t−s)EsZ
s,x
t dt = A (s) kxk+B (s) .
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Uncertainty in Capital Income

CHAPTER 2
Keynes-Ramsey Rules in Continuous-Time Setups Under Le´vy
Uncertainty∗
Abstract. Keynes-Ramsey rules for describing the optimal consumption behavior in a
continuous time setup under uncertainty are “incomplete” in the sense that they provide
only the evolution of the marginal utility process and not the evolution of the optimal
consumption process itself. Only recently, “complete” Keynes-Ramsey rules have been
derived in a setup with CRRA (constant relative risk aversion) utility functions and un-
certainty caused by Brownian motion or Poisson processes. But these processes provide
only a limited tool for modeling dynamic uncertainty. New results can be achieved by
using Le´vy processes. We show how the evolution of the optimal consumption process
can be derived if uncertainty stems from a Le´vy process and the consumption function
is not necessarily of the CRRA type.
JEL classification: C61; D81; D91
Keywords: Optimal consumption; Le´vy processes; Keynes-Ramsey rule
∗I am indebted to Klaus Wa¨lde for encouraging discussions concerning Le´vy processes, and I would
like to thank Udo Broll for helpful comments.
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1. Introduction
Understanding optimal consumption and saving behavior of households is central
to understand many macroeconomic phenomena. For example, in models of economic
growth the aggregate savings of the households in an economy yield the capital stock of
that economy, see, e.g., Steger (2005) and Wa¨lde (2005). In a dynamic setup, the most
“valuable” result is a closed-form expression for the optimal consumption or saving rule,
usually given by a Markov policy, i.e., by a function of current wealth and other state
variables, cf., e.g., Merton (1971). But unfortunately, finding such an expression is rather
the exception than the rule. Nevertheless, it is in most cases possible to derive a Keynes-
Ramsey rule, which describes the evolution of the optimal consumption process over time.
This rule is available for deterministic models in both continuous and discrete time (see,
e.g., Cass, 1965, and Koopman, 1965) and for stochastic models in discrete time (see,
e.g., de Hek, 1999). As will be discussed in turn, it has not yet been completely derived
for stochastic models in continuous time. The present paper therefore provides a Keynes-
Ramsey rule in a continuous-time setup with general utility and uncertainty stemming
from a Le´vy process, i.e., from a process with stationary and independent increments,
thus including the special cases with Brownian motion and Poisson processes.
Keynes-Ramsey rules for stochastic continuous-time models provided in the economic
literature are “incomplete” in the sense that they describe only the evolution of the mar-
ginal utility process induced by optimal consumption behavior and not the evolution of
the optimal consumption process itself, see, e.g., Turnovsky (2000) and Wa¨lde (1999,
2002). Only recently, Steger (2005) and Sennewald and Wa¨lde (2006) presented “com-
plete” Keynes-Ramsey rules assuming CRRA utility functions and uncertainty stemming
from Brownian motion or Poisson processes. But in many cases, these processes rep-
resent a poor model for dynamic uncertainty in real data. For example, a frequently
used model for asset price dynamics is the geometric Brownian motion, which implies
normally distributed logreturns for all time spans in question. But whereas monthly
logreturn data are fitted very well by a normal distribution, daily or weekly logreturns
exhibit more mass around the origin and in the tails than the normal distribution can
provide, see, e.g., Eberlein and Keller (1995). The authors show that the logreturns can
be fitted much better by the hyperbolic distribution, and that therefore hyperbolic Le´vy
processes are more appropriate for modeling uncertainty of stock prices. Other authors
as, e.g., Barndorﬀ-Nielsen (1997), propose a similar class of Le´vy processes – processes
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of the normal inverse Gaussian type – for a more realistic stock-price modeling. The
contribution of the present paper lies in introducing Le´vy processes and in providing a
method that allows to deduce the evolution of the optimal consumption process from the
evolution of the marginal utility process for arbitrary utility functions.
We consider a model in which the household’s objective is to maximize his expected
lifetime utility by choosing between consumption and investment in a risky asset. At first
glance, this one-asset framework seems to be rather unrealistic. But introducing alterna-
tive investment opportunities, risky or risk-free, as in, e.g., Merton (1971) or Turnovsky
(2000), and thus taking into account that households may react to changes in riskiness by
reallocation among assets, does not change the results substantially. Furthermore, many
types of macroeconomic uncertainty aﬀect the returns of all assets, including risk-free
assets as, e.g., a bank account or government bonds. Moreover, for an economy as a
whole, real capital constitutes the only form of saving. Therefore the model presented
here can also be understood as a model of growth under uncertainty. Here, again, Le´vy
processes may appear more adequate for modeling shocks in, e.g., capital or productivity,
even though there are no empirical results on that issue available yet.
The paper is organized as follows. In the subsequent section we introduce the optimum-
consumption problem. Section 3 contains the derivation of the Keynes-Ramsey rule. In
Section 4 we consider some examples with special Le´vy processes (Brownian motion,
Poisson processes, and hyperbolic Le´vy processes, which were proposed by Eberlein and
Keller, 1995), and the results in Steger (2005) for the optimal growth of average con-
sumption in a model of economic growth under Gaussian and Poisson uncertainty are
reproduced. Section 5, finally, concludes.
2. The Setup
2.1. The budget constraint. Let the wealth of a household at time t, a (t), be given
by the number of stocks n (t) it owns times their price v (t). That is, a (t) = n (t) v (t).
Assume the price v (t) to be a geometric Le´vy process, following the stochastic diﬀerential
equation
dv (t) = µv (t) dt+ v (t−) dx (t) , (1)
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where µ ∈ R and x (t) is a Le´vy process, i.e., x (t) is ca´dla´g and has stationary and
independent increments.1,2 Suppose that x (t) has finite expectation, i.e., E |x (t)| < ∞,
and that its jumps are not smaller than −1. The latter condition ensures that the
asset price v (t) always remains positive. As shown in Appendix A.1, the first condition,
E |x (t)| <∞, holds if and only if the logreturns have finite expectation. Thus, since asset
prices exhibit usually bounded logreturns (see, e.g., Eberlein and Keller, 1995), assuming
E |x (t)| <∞ does not limit the scope of the model. The existence of the first moments
of x (t) is equivalent to the fact that x (t) has not “too many big jumps”, which in turn
allows the following representation of x (t) (see, e.g., Sato, 1999):
x (t) = E [x (1)] t+ z˜ (t) +
R∞
−1 ζq˜ (t, dζ) . (2)
Here z˜ (t) denotes a Brownian motion and q˜ (t, ·) = q (t, ·) − tλ (·) an independent com-
pensated Poisson measure, where q (t, ·) is the Poisson measure that, roughly speaking,
counts the jumps of x (t) and λ (·) = E [q (1, ·)] can be understood as the corresponding
arrival rate of q (t, ·). More precisely, given a Borel set A ⊂ R, q (t, A) counts the jumps of
x (t) with size ζ ∈ A that occur up to time t. Thus, λ (A) represents the average number
of jumps with size in A that occur per unit of time, and it is called the Le´vy measure of
x (t).
Equation (2) shows that x (t) can be decomposed into a sum consisting of a lin-
ear deterministic part, a Brownian motion, and a jump part, which is independent of
the Brownian motion. The integral
R∞
−1 ζq˜ (t, ζ) may be rewritten as
R∞
−1 ζq˜ (t, dζ) =R∞
−1 ζq (t, dζ) − t
R∞
−1 ζλ (dζ), where
R∞
−1 ζq (t, dζ) represents the “sum” of all jumps the
process x (t) makes up to time t and t
R∞
−1 ζλ (dζ) is the expectation of that sum. Thus,
unlike composite Poisson processes, Le´vy processes allow for a continuum of jump sizes.
Recall that, in order to ensure positive prices v (t), we assumed only jumps of a size
greater than −1, whereas in the general case x (t) may also have jumps less than −1. If
the jump size can only take a certain value α > −1, we obtain the simple Poisson setup,
i.e.,
R∞
−1 ζq˜ (t, dζ) = αq (t)− αλt, where q (t) is a Poisson process with arrival rate λ.
The increments of the Brownian motion z˜ (t) have variance V ar [z˜ (t)− z˜ (s)]
= (t− s)σ2, where the parameter σ > 0 depends on the underlying Le´vy process, x (t).
1A process is called ca´dla´g if its paths are continuous from the right with left limits. The expression
ca´dla´g is an acronym from the french “continu a´ droite, limites a´ gauche”.
2A detailed introduction into the topic of Le´vy processes can be found in, e.g., Jacod and Shiryaev
(1987), Protter (1995), or Sato (1999).
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Hence, we may express z˜ (t) by z˜ (t) = σz (t), where z (t) denotes a standard Brownian
motion with V ar [z (t)− z (s)] = t− s.
Clearly, both the Brownian motion and the jump part are martingales. Thus, E [x (t)]
= E [x (1)] t grows linearly in time, and we can say that the paths of a Levy process are
given by a linear deterministic trend with both continuous and jump disturbances that
are zero in average. The variance of x (t) is given by V ar [x (t)] =
³
σ2 +
R∞
−1 ζ
2λ (dζ)
´
t.
Inserting the Le´vy decomposition (2) into the price diﬀerential (1) and assuming
without loss of generality the expectation of the Le´vy process to be zero, i.e., E [x (1)] =
0,3 we obtain
dv (t) = µv (t) dt+ σv (t) dz (t) + v (t−)
R∞
−1 ζq˜ (dt, dζ) . (3)
Thus, the asset price grows in average with the deterministic rate µ and is disturbed by
“white” and jump noise.
Let the household earn dividend payments π (t) per unit of asset it owns and labor
income w (t). Assume furthermore that it spends c (t) on consumption. When buying
assets is the only way of saving, the number of stocks held by the household changes in
a deterministic way according to
dn (t) =
n (t)π (t) + w (t)− c (t)
v (t)
dt. (4)
Thus, when savings n (t)π (t) + w (t)− p (t) c (t) are positive, the number of stocks held
by the household increases by savings divided by the price of one stock. When savings
are negative, the number of stocks decreases.
The change of the household’s wealth, i.e., the household’s budget constraint, is then
simply given by applying the change-of-variables formula on a (t) = n (t) v (t) and the
diﬀerentials (3) and (4)4
da (t) = v (t)
n (t)π (t) + w (t)− c (t)
v (t)
dt+ µn (t) v (t) dt
+σn (t) v (t) dz (t) + n (t−) v (t−)
R∞
−1 ζq˜ (dt, dζ)
= [r (t) a (t) + w (t)− c (t)] dt+ σa (t) dz (t) + a (t−)
R∞
−1 ζq˜ (dt, dζ) , (5)
where the interest rate is defined as r (t) ≡ µ+ π (t) /v (t). Budget constraint (5) shows
that the general framework with Le´vy processes includes also the special cases with Brow-
nian motion and Poisson processes as considered in, e.g., Steger (2005) or, in a slightly
3If E [x (1)] 6= 0, we include E [x (1)] in the drift parameter µ in (1), cf. also Subsection 4.2.
4The change-of-variables formula is given in Appendix A.2, Corollary 1.
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diﬀerent setup with an additional riskless asset, in Turnovsky (2000) and Sennewald and
Wa¨lde (2006).
2.2. The optimal control problem. Let the household derive utility from con-
sumption with an instantaneous utility function u (c) that is three times continuously
diﬀerentiable. Starting at time s ≥ 0 and given a fixed time preference rate ρ > 0 the
household’s objective consists in choosing an optimal consumption path that maximizes
the expected lifetime utility,
U c(t) (s, a (s)) = E
R∞
s e
−ρ[t−s]u(c(t))dt
subject to budget constraint (5). Assume that an optimal consumption process c∗ (t) that
is given by a Markov policy exists. That is, the optimal consumption expenditure at time
t depends only on wealth at t and time t itself. Thus, the only way that uncertainty aﬀects
c∗ (t) is through a (t) and we may express, if we find it convenient, c∗ (t) by c∗ (t, a (t)).
The value function V is defined as the expected lifetime utility derived from the
optimal consumption process. That is,
V (s, a (s)) ≡ E
R∞
s e
−ρ[t−s]u(c∗(t))dt. (6)
3. The Keynes-Ramsey rule
In this section we show, how starting with the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equa-
tion, one can derive a Keynes-Ramsey rule for the optimal control problem stated above.
Assume that the value function V is twice continuously diﬀerentiable. Then, according
to, e.g., Øksendal and Sulem (2005, Ch. 3), it solves the HJB equation5
ρV (t, a) = max
c≥0
(
u (c) + Vt (t, a) + [r (t) a+ w (t)− c]Va (t, a) + 12σ2a2Vaa (t, a)
+
R∞
−1 [V (t, (1 + ζ) a)− V (t, a)− ζaVa (t, a)]λ (dζ)
)
,
(7)
where Vt denotes the partial derivative of V with respect to the time argument t and Va
and Vaa the first and second derivatives, respectively, with respect to a. The maximum
5Similar to the problem for Poisson uncertainty described in Sennewald (2007) or Chapter 1 of this
thesis, the boundedness condition for the instantaneous utility function and the diﬀerential coeﬃcients
still holds if one wishes to apply the HJB equation as a necessary condition under Le´vy uncertainty. The
reference mentioned here, Øksendal and Sulem (2005), actually only covers the suﬃciency property of
the HJB equation. A heuristic derivation of the HJB equation can be found in Appendix A.3.
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in (7) is attained by the optimal Markov control c∗ (t, a). Assuming that c∗ is an interior
maximum, i.e., c∗ > 0, the first-order condition is then found to be
u0 (c∗) = Va (t, a) . (8)
In the next step, we compute the evolution of the marginal value Va (t, a (t)) evaluated
along the optimally controlled wealth process a (t). Since there is no risk of confusion
in the following, we shall as from now write c instead of c∗ for the optimal consumption
expenditure. With budget constraint (5), the change-of-variables formula then yields6
dVa (t, a (t)) = Vta (t, a (t)) dt
+ [r (t) a (t) + w (t)− c (t)]Vaa (t, a (t)) dt+
1
2
σ2a2 (t)Vaaa (t, a (t)) dt
+σa (t)Vaa (t, a (t)) dz (t)
+
R∞
−1 [Va (t, (1 + ζ) a (t))− Va (a (t))− ζa (t)Vaa (t, a (t))]λ (dζ) dt
+
R∞
−1 [Va (t, (1 + ζ) a (t−))− Va (t, a (t−))] q˜ (dt, dζ) , (9)
where Vaaa stands for the third derivative of V with respect to a. On the other hand, the
derivation of the maximized HJB equation (7) with respect to a yields according to the
envelope theorem
ρVa (t, a) = Vta (t, a) + r (t)Va (t, a) + [r (t) a+ w (t)− c]Vaa (t, a)
+σ2aVaa (t, a) +
1
2
σ2a2Vaaa (t, a)
+
d
da
R∞
−1 [V (t, (1 + ζ) a)− V (t, a)− ζaVa (t, a)]λ (dζ) .
Assuming that diﬀerentiation and integral on the right-most term on the right-hand hand
side are interchangeable, rearranging leads to
(ρ− r (t))Va (t, a)− σ2aVaa (t, a)−
R∞
−1 ζ [Va (t, (1 + ζ) a)− Va (t, a)]λ (dζ)
= Vta (t, a) + [r (t) a+ w (t)− c]Vaa (t, a) +
1
2
σ2a2Vaaa (a)
+
R∞
−1 [Va (t, (1 + ζ)a)− Va (t, a)− ζaVaa (t, a)]λ (dζ) .
Inserting this expression evaluated at a (t) into the stochastic diﬀerential (9) yields
dVa (a (t)) =
"
(ρ− r (t))Va (t, a (t))− σ2a (t)Vaa (t, a (t))
−
R∞
−1 ζ [Va (t, (1 + ζ) a (t))− Va (t, a (t))]λ (dζ)
#
dt
+σa (t)Vaa (t, a (t)) dz (t) +
R∞
−1 [Va (t, (1 + ζ) a (t−))− Va (t, a (t−))] q˜ (dt, dζ) .
6For the change-of-variables formula see Corollary 1 in Appendix A.2.
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Now replacing Va with u
0
, according to the first-order condition (8), and Vaa with u00 (c) ca
(which is also due to (8) and where ca ≡ ∂c (t, a) /∂a stands for the marginal prospensity
to consume), we arrive at the Keynes-Ramsey rule in the “traditional” form as derived in,
e.g., Turnovsky (2000) for Gaussian uncertainty (and a slightly diﬀerent setup in which
also a riskless asset is available)
du0 (c (t))
u0 (c (t−))
=
½
ρ− r (t)− u
00 (c (t))
u0 (c (t))
ca (t) a (t)σ2 −
R∞
−1 ζ
·
u0 (cζ (t))
u0 (c (t))
− 1
¸
λ (dζ)
¾
dt
+
u00 (c (t))
u0 (c (t))
ca (t) a (t)σdz (t) +
R∞
−1
·
u0 (cζ (t−))
u0 (c (t−))
− 1
¸
q˜ (dt, dζ) . (10)
Here cζ (t) denotes the optimal consumption expenditure when a jump in wealth by
ζ percent has occurred, i.e., cζ (t) = c (t, (1 + ζ) a (t)). In this version of the Keynes-
Ramsey rule, the optimal consumption behavior is given implicitly by the evolution of
the marginal utility. In the following we derive from (10) the evolution of the optimal
consumption process itself. To this end, we only need to apply the change-of-variables
formula from Corollary 1 in Appendix A.2 on the mapping y 7→ (u0)−1 (y), where for y
we insert the marginal utility u0 (c (t)) whose evolution is given by (10). That yields
dc (t) = − 1
u00 (c (t))



[r (t)− ρ]u0 (c (t))
+
£
1
2
u000 (c (t)) ca (t) a (t) + u00 (c (t))
¤
ca (t) a (t)σ2
−
R∞
−1 (1 + ζ) [u
0 (c (t))− u0 (cζ (t))]λ (dζ)



dt
+
R∞
−1 [cζ (t−)− c (t−)]λ (dζ) dt+ ca (t) a (t)σdz (t) +
R∞
−1 [cζ (t−)− c (t−)] q˜ (dt, dζ) ,
where we used that according to the rule df−1 (f (x)) /df (x) = 1/f 0 (x),
d (u0)−1 (u (c))
du (c)
=
1
u00 (c)
and
d2 (u0)−1 (u (c))
[du (c)]2
= − u
000 (c)
[u00 (c)]3
.
If we denote the Arrow-Pratt measure for relative risk aversion by
θ (t) ≡ −u
00 (c (t))
u0 (c (t))
c (t)
and the measure for relative prudence by
η (t) ≡ −u
000 (c (t))
u00 (c (t))
c (t) ,
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rearranging leads to
θ (t−)
dc (t)
c (t−)
= [r (t)− ρ] dt+
·
1
2
η (t)
ca (t) a (t)
c (t)
− 1
¸
θ (t)
ca (t) a (t)
c (t)
σ2dt
−
R∞
−1 (1 + ζ)
·
1− u
0 (cζ (t))
u0 (c (t))
¸
λ (dζ) dt+ θ (t)
ca (t) a (t)
c (t)
σdz (t)
+θ (t−)
R∞
−1
·
cζ (t−)
c (t−)
− 1
¸
q (dt, dζ) , (11)
Unlike (10), this version of the Keynes-Ramsey rule describes explicitly the evolution of
the optimal consumption process. In a deterministic setup, the left-hand side must be
equal to the first term on the right-hand side, see, e.g., Barro and Sala-i-Mart´ın (1995).
The other terms on the right-hand side are thus due to the uncertainty introduced by
the Le´vy process x (t). More precisely, the second and fourth term appear because of
the diﬀusion part, whereas the third and fifth term stem from the jump part of the Le´vy
process.
Keynes-Ramsey rule (11) shows that some interpretations from the deterministic setup
carry over to the stochastic environment: Assuming that u satisfies the usual conditions,
i.e., u0 > 0 and u00 < 0, we can conclude that the higher the interest rate r (t) or the
lower the time preference rate ρ the more consumption the household sacrifices today for
consumption tomorrow, i.e., dc (t) /c (t−) goes up.
If the utility function is of the CRRA type, given by
u (c) =
c1−γ − 1
1− γ , γ > 0, γ 6= 1,
7 (12)
the measures for relative risk aversion and prudence are constants and read θ = γ and
η = 1 + γ, respectively. Then Keynes-Ramsey rule (11) reads
dc (t)
c (t−)
=
½
r (t)− ρ
γ
−
·
1− 1
2
(1 + γ)
ca (t) a (t)
c (t)
¸
ca (t) a (t)
c (t)
σ2
¾
dt
−1
γ
R∞
−1 (1 + ζ)
"
1−
µ
cζ (t)
c (t)
¶−γ#
λ (dζ) dt
+
ca (t) a (t)
c (t)
σdz (t) +
R∞
−1
·
cζ (t−)
c (t−)
− 1
¸
q (dt, dζ) . (13)
7The following also applies to the special case γ → 1, i.e. u (c) = log c.
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Taking expectation on the latter diﬀerential yields the expected growth rate of optimal
consumption
dEc (t) /dt
c (t)
=
r (t)− ρ
γ
−
·
1− 1
2
(1 + γ)
ca (t) a (t)
c (t)
¸
ca (t) a (t)
c (t)
σ2
−1
γ
R∞
−1
(
(1 + ζ)
"
1−
µ
cζ (t)
c (t)
¶−γ#
− γ
·
cζ (t)
c (t)
− 1
¸)
λ (dζ) . (14)
Here we used the martingale property of the Brownian motion z (t) and the compensated
Poisson measure q˜ (t, ·), cf. Subsection 2.1. If the flow of labor income w is equal to
zero, one can show that the optimal consumption expenditure is proportional to current
wealth. In this case, using that then
cζ (t)
c (t)
=
(1 + ζ) a (t)
a (t)
= 1 + ζ,
Keynes-Ramsey rule (13) and the expected consumption growth rate (14) read
dc (t)
c (t−)
=
·
r (t)− ρ
γ
− 1
2
(1− γ)σ2
¸
dt− 1
γ
R∞
−1
£
(1 + ζ)− (1 + ζ)1−γ − γζ
¤
λ (dζ) dt
+σdz (t) +
R∞
−1 ζq˜ (dt, dζ)
and
dEc (t) /dt
c (t)
=
·
r (t)− ρ
γ
− 1
2
(1− γ)σ2
¸
dt− 1
γ
R∞
−1
£
(1 + ζ)− (1 + ζ)1−γ − γζ
¤
λ (dζ) dt.
(15)
Equation (15) allows us analyze the eﬀects of risk on the average consumption growth.
Recall that the variance of the underlying stochastic process, i.e., our measure of risk, is
given by V ar [x (t)] =
³
σ2 +
R∞
−1 ζ
2λ (dζ)
´
t. Then, looking at Equation (15), it is easy to
see that an increased risk due to a rise in the variance of the Brownian-motion part, σ2,
leads to lower (higher) consumption growth if the relative risk aversion γ is less (greater)
than 1, whereas consumption growth remains unaﬀected in the log-utility case with γ = 1.
As is shown in Appendix A.4, the same result holds true if risk increases due to a higher
variance of the jump part,
R∞
−1 ζ
2λ (dζ). Notice that while rising the variance of x (t),
the expected value remains unchanged. Hence, the well-known results on the eﬀects of
capital risk on the average consumption growth obtained for diﬀerent setups with, e.g.,
Brownian motion and Poisson processes (cf. Steger, 2005 and Sennewald and Wa¨lde,
2006) or generally distributed increments in discrete time (cf. de Hek, 1999) carry over
to the continuous-time case with Le´vy uncertainty. The intuitive argumentation behind
these findings is standard. On the one hand, higher risk makes the consumer less willing
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to save since he faces a higher probability of loss. This is the so called substitution eﬀect.
On the other hand, increased risk leads to more saving in order to protect oneself against
very low levels of future consumption. This is called the income eﬀect. In case of low
risk aversion (i.e., γ < 1) the substitution eﬀect dominates the income eﬀect, whereas
the opposite holds true if risk aversion is high (i.e., γ > 1). Only in case of log-utility
(γ = 1) both eﬀects are balanced.
4. Examples
4.1. Geometric Brownian motion. As mentioned before, the Le´vy-process frame-
work covers the special case in which the asset price is given as a geometric Brownian
motion, i.e., dv (t) = µv (t) dt+σv (t) dz (t). Under this assumption the budget constraint
turns out to be
da (t) = [r (t) a (t) + w (t)− c (t)] dt+ σa (t) dz (t) ,
and the corresponding Keynes-Ramsey rule reads (cf. Equation (11))
θ (t)
dc (t)
c (t)
= [r (t)− ρ] dt+
·
1
2
η (t)
ca (t) a (t)
c (t)
− 1
¸
ca (t) a (t)
c (t)
σ2dt+θ (t)
ca (t) a (t)
c (t)
σdz (t) ,
or, for the CRRA utility function (12),
dc (t)
c (t)
=
½
r (t)− ρ
γ
−
·
1− 1
2
(1 + γ)
ca (t) a (t)
c (t)
¸
ca (t) a (t)
c (t)
σ2
¾
dt+
ca (t) a (t)
c (t)
σdz (t) .
Taking expectation on the latter stochastic diﬀerential gives the average consumption
growth rate
dEc (t) /dt
c (t)
=
r (t)− ρ
γ
−
·
1− 1
2
(1 + γ)
ca (t) a (t)
c (t)
¸
ca (t) a (t)
c (t)
σ2.
If labor income w is equal to zero, this growth rate simplifies to
dEc (t) /dt
c (t)
=
r (t)− ρ
γ
− 1
2
(1− γ)σ2,
which, with a slightly diﬀerent notation, coincides with Steger’s (2005) Equation (5).
4.2. Poisson processes. Assume that the asset price evolves deterministically with
jumps at random times according to
dv (t) = µv (t) dt+ αv (t−) dq1 (t)− βv (t−) dq2 (t) , (16)
where α ≥ 0, 0 ≤ β < 1, and q1 and q2 are Poisson processes with arrival rates λ1 and
λ2, respectively. Now the price grows continuously with the rate µ, and at random times
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it jumps upwards by α percent (when dq1 (t) = 1) or downwards by β percent (when
dq2 (t) = 1). To achieve a martingale structure as in diﬀerential (3), we rewrite (16) to
dv (t) = (µ+ λ1α− λ2β) v (t) dt+ αv (t−) dq˜1 (t)− βv (t−) dq˜2 (t) ,
where q˜i (t) = qi (t)− λit, i = 1, 2, denote the compensated Poisson processes. Then, the
budget constraint reads
da (t) = [ra (t) + w (t)− c (t)] dt+ a (t−) [αdq˜1 (t)− βdq˜2 (t)] ,
with r = µ + λ1α − λ2β and where for sake of simplicity dividend payments are not
taken into account. In analogy to (11), optimal consumption growth must then obey
Keynes-Ramsey rule
θ(t−)
dc (t)
c (t−)
= (µ− ρ) dt− λ1 (1 + α)
·
1− u
0 (cα (t))
u0 (c (t))
¸
dt+ λ2 (1− β)
·
u0 (c−β (t))
u0 (c (t))
− 1
¸
dt
+θ (t−) [cα (t−)− c (t−)] dq1 (t)− θ (t−) [c (t−)− c−β (t−)] dq2 (t) ,
where cα (t) and c−β (t) denote the optimal consumption expenditures if the asset price
at t jumps upwards (dq1 (t) = 1) and downwards (dq2 (t) = 1), respectively. In case of
CRRA utility function (12) the Keynes-Ramsey rule reads
dc (t)
c (t−)
=
µ− ρ
γ
dt− λ1 (1 + α)
γ
"
1−
µ
cα (t)
c (t)
¶−γ#
dt+
λ2 (1− β)
γ
"µ
c−β (t)
c (t)
¶−γ
− 1
#
dt
+
·
cα (t−)
c (t−)
− 1
¸
dq1 (t)−
·
1− c−β (t−)
c (t−)
¸
dq2 (t) .
Setting w = 0, assuming that the jumps are symmetric, i.e., λ1 = λ2 and α = β, and
taking expectation, we find further
dEc (t) /dt
c (t)
=
µ− ρ
γ
− λ1
2− (1 + α)1−γ − (1− α)1−γ
γ
which, only with diﬀerent notation, is the same result as derived by Steger (2005, Eq.
(7)).
4.3. Hyperbolic Le´vy motion. Let x (t) be a centered and symmetric hyper-
bolic Le´vy process. That is, the increments of x (t) are hyperbolic distributed sym-
metrically around zero. Then x is a pure jump martingale with representation x (t) =R t
0
R
R\{0} ζ [q (dt, dζ)− λ (dζ) dt], cf. Eberlein and Keller (1995). The Le´vy measure λ
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has density8
g (ζ) =
1
π2 |ζ|
R∞
0
e−|ζ|
√
2y+(φ/δ)2
y
£
J21
¡
δ
√
2y
¢
+ Y 21
¡
δ
√
2y
¢¤dy + e−|ζ||ζ| ,
where J1 and Y1 denote the Bessel functions with index 1 of the first and second kind,
respectively. Notice that x (t) may have jumps minor than −1, so that the asset price
v (t) may become negative. We therefore stop the decision problem at the time the
asset price falls below −1 for the first time, i.e., at T ≡ inf {t > 0 : ∆x (t) < −1}. The
household maximizes then U c(t) (s, a (s)) = Es
R T
s e
−ρ[t−s]u(c(t))dt and, as long as t < T ,
the Keynes-Ramsey rule reads9
θ (t−)
dc (t)
c (t−)
= [r (t)− ρ] dt−
R∞
−1 (1 + ζ)
·
1− u
0 (cζ (t))
u0 (c (t))
¸
g (ζ) dζdt
+θ (t−)
R∞
−1
·
cζ (t−)
c (t−)
− 1
¸
q (dt, dζ) .
For CRRA utility function (12) this Keynes-Ramsey rule becomes
dc (t)
c (t−)
=
r (t)− ρ
γ
dt− 1
γ
R∞
−1 (1 + ζ)
"
1−
µ
cζ (t)
c (t)
¶−γ#
g (ζ) dζdt
+
R∞
−1
·
cζ (t−)
c (t−)
− 1
¸
q (dt, dζ) .
Taking expectation yields the average consumption growth rate
dEc (t) /dt
c (t)
=
r (t)− ρ
γ
− 1
γ
R∞
−1
(
(1 + ζ)
"
1−
µ
cζ (t)
c (t)
¶−γ#
− γ
·
cζ (t)
c (t)
− 1
¸)
g (ζ) dζ.
and for w = 0 we finally obtain
dEc (t) /dt
c (t)
=
r (t)− ρ
γ
− 1
γ
R∞
−1
£
(1 + ζ)− (1 + ζ)1−γ − γζ
¤
g (ζ) dζ.
5. Conclusion
In a continuous-time setup and under Le´vy uncertainty we have derived a version of
the Keynes-Ramsey rule that describes explicitly the evolution of the optimal consump-
tion process, given any arbitrary suﬃciently smooth utility function. Le´vy processes allow
a much more realistic modelling of stock prices. From the general Le´vy framework we
have drawn the special cases with Brownian motion, Poisson processes, and processes
8That is, λ (dη) = g (η) dη.
9According to Øksendal and Sulem (2005, Ch. 3), the HJB equation does not change by introducing
a stopping time, such as our T . The Keynes-Ramsey rule can therefore be derived as shown in Section
3.
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with hyperbolic distributed increments, and the results for the average evolution of op-
timal consumption in a growth model under uncertainty from Steger (2005) have been
reproduced.
The model presented in this paper can be applied easily to the analysis of economic
growth under uncertainty. Here also, Le´vy processes may be more suitable for modeling
dynamic uncertainty as, e.g., shocks in productivity. To find out which class of Le´vy
processes fits best to real data is left for further (empirical) research.
A. Appendix
A.1. Logreturns and noise with finite expectation. We prove that E |x (t)| <
∞ iﬀ E log v (t) < ∞. Recall that the asset price v (t) obeys the stochastic diﬀerential
equation (1). If we define the process y (t) ≡ µt+ x (t), which is also a Le´vy process, we
may rewrite (1) to dv (t) = v (t−) dy (t). Then, since v (t) is positive by construction, we
know from Goll and Kallsen (1999, Lemma 5.8) that v (t) is an exponential Le´vy process,
i.e., there exists a Le´vy process y˜ (t) with v (t) = v0ey˜(t). This in turn allows, again with
Goll and Kallsen (1999, Lemma 5.8), to conclude that y˜ (t) has finite expectation if and
only if x (t) has finite expectation.
A.2. The change-of-variables formula (Itoˆ’s formula) for Le´vy processes.
The following change-of-variables formula is taken from Gihman and Skorohod (1972,
p.128).
Theorem 1. Let for k = 1, . . . , d the process yk (t) exhibits the following decomposi-
tion:
yk (t) = yk (0) + αk (t) + βk (t) + γk (t) ,
where αk (t) is a deterministic and continuous process, βk (t) a continuous martingale,
and γk (t) a stochastic pure-jump process with Le´vy measure λ. More precisely, γk (t) is
given by
γk (t) =
R t
0
R
R φk (s−, ζ) q˜ (ds, dζ) =
R t
0
R
R φk (s−, ζ) q (ds, dζ)−
R t
0
R
R φk (s, ζ)λ (dζ) ds,
where the measure q (t, ·) does not depend on the martingales βk (t) and φk (s, ζ) is a
integrable, ca´dla´g process that depends on the jumps size ζ. If f : [0,∞)× Rd → R is a
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twice continuously diﬀerentiable function, the process f (t, y (t)) obeys
df (t, y (t)) = ft (t, y (t)) dt+
dP
k=1
fyk (t, y (t)) d [αk (t) + βk (t)]
+
1
2
dP
k,l=1
fykyl (t, y (t)) hβk (t) , βl (t)i
+
R
Rd
"
f (t, y (t) + φ (t, ζ))− f (t, y (t))
−
Pd
k=1 fyk (t, y (t))φk (t, ζ)
#
λ (dζ) dt
+
R
Rd [f (t, y (t−) + φ (t−, ζ))− f (t, y (t−))] q˜ (dt, dζ) .
Here hβk (t) , βl (t)i stands for the quadratic covariation process of βk (t) and βl (t), ft and
fyk for the partial derivatives of f with respect to t and yk, and φ is the vector function
consisting of the components φ1, . . . , φd.
Using that the quadratic covariation is bilinear and that for two independent standard
Brownian motions z1 (t) and z2 (t), hzi (t) , zj (t)i = δijt, i, j = 1, 2, we deduce with a slight
change of the notation the following corollary.
Corollary 1. Let y (t) be a d-dimensional stochastic process whose components obey
dyk (t) = αk (t, y (t)) dt+ βk (t, y (t)) dzk (t) +
R
R γk (t−, y (t−) , ζ) q˜ (dt, dζ) .
If the function f is given as above, then
df (t, y (t)) = ft (t, y (t)) dt+
dP
k=1
fyk (t, y (t))αk (t, y (t)) dt
+
1
2
dP
k,l=1
fykyl (t, y (t))βk (t, y (t))βl (t, y (t)) dt
+
dP
k=1
fyk (t, y (t))βk (t, y (t)) dzk (t)
+
R
Rd
"
f (t, y (t) + γ (t, y (t) , ζ))− f (t, y (t))
−
Pd
k=1 fyk (t, y (t)) γk (t, y (t−) , ζ)
#
λ (dζ) dt
+
R
Rd
[f (t, y (t−) + γ (t−, y (t−) , ζ))− f (t, y (t−))] q˜ (dt, dζ) ,
where γ = (γ1, . . . , γd)
T .
A.3. A heuristic derivation of the HJB equation. This appendix shows how
HJB equation (7) can be heuristically derived. As a starting point, we write the HJB
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equation in the general form as
ρV (t, a (t)) = max
c(t)
½
u (c (t)) +
1
dt
EtdV (t, a (t))
¾
, (17)
where the maximum is achieved by the optimal consumption choice c∗ (t), and V de-
notes the value function (6). The general HJB equation (17) says that the household
chooses consumption in t such that she maximizes her instantaneous return from con-
sumption, which consists of the instantaneous utility flow u (c (t)) plus the expected
change 1dtEtdV (t, a (t)) in the value of wealth corresponding to the consumption choice
in t. It tells furthermore that the intertemporal return ρV (t, a (t)) from holding a (t)
is given by the return from the optimal consumption in t, u (c∗ (t)) + 1dtEtdV (t, a (t)).
We see that, when determining the optimal behavior at t, the household only needs to
consider the value function at t and its expected change in order to cover future behavior.
This is a direct result of Bellman’s principle of optimality, see, e.g., Bellman (1957).
Assume that V is once continuously diﬀerentiable. Obtaining the HJB equation for
a specific maximization problem then requires (i) application of CVF on V (t, a (t)), (ii)
computing expectations and (iii) “dividing” by dt. With budget constraint (5), CVF
from Corollary 1 in Appendix A.2 yields
dV (t, a (t)) = Vt (t, a (t)) dt
+ [r (t) a (t) + w (t)− c (t)]Va (t, a (t)) dt+
1
2
σ2a2 (t)Vaa (t, a (t)) dt
+σa (t)Va (t, a (t)) dz (t)
+
R∞
−1 [V (t, (1 + ζ) a (t))− V (a (t))− ζa (t)Va (t, a (t))]λ (dζ) dt
+
R∞
−1 [V (t, (1 + ζ) a (t−))− V (t, a (t−))] q˜ (dt, dζ) , (18)
where Vx and Vxy denote the partial derivatives of the value function. Using that, anal-
ogously to Poisson processes, the expected value of the compensated jumps of size ζ,
q˜ (t, ζ) = q (t, ζ)− tλ(ζ), is equal to zero, we find that the expected value of the last term
in (18) is zero, too. Also, the dz(t)-term becomes zero when taking expectation. The
expected value of (18) hence reads
Etd (t, a (t)) = Vt (t, a (t)) dt
+{[r (t) a (t) + w (t)− c (t)]Va (t, a (t)) + 1
2
σ2a2 (t)Vaa (t, a (t))}dt
+
R∞
−1 [V (t, (1 + ζ) a (t))− V (a (t))− ζa (t)Va (t, a (t))]λ (dζ) dt.
Dividing by dt gives and inserting into (17) finally yields HJB equation (7).
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A.4. The eﬀects of jump risk on the optimal consumption growth. Recall
that the variance of the Le´vy process x (t) is given by V ar [x (t)] =
³
σ2 +
R∞
−1 ζ
2λ (dζ)
´
t.
Thus, an increase of risk in the jump part may be due to a rise in the “arrival rate” λ
or due to higher jump sizes ζ. We shall show that in both cases the usual results on
the eﬀect of risk hold true, namely that for low risk aversion (γ < 1) consumption grows
more slowly, for high risk aversion (γ > 1) consumption grows faster, and for γ = 1 risk
has no impact on the consumption growth rate at all.
A.4.1. Increasing λ. A rise in λ (ζ) means that jumps with size ζ occur with a higher
intensity. To see how this aﬀects the optimal consumption growth, we consider Keynes-
Ramsey rule (15). Then we find that the sign of the term g (γ) ≡ −1/γ[(1 + ζ) −
(1 + ζ)1−γ − γζ] determines whether a higher λ (ζ) has a positive or negative impact on
the consumption growth. We show that
g (γ)



< 0 for γ < 1;
= 0 for γ = 1;
> 0 for γ < 1.
(19)
Since for γ = 1, g (γ) obviously becomes zero, this statement is true if the derivative of
g,
g0 (γ) =
1
γ2
£
(1 + ζ)− (1 + ζ)1−γ − γζ
¤
− 1
γ
£
(1 + ζ)1−γ ln (1 + ζ)− ζ
¤
,
is negative. Collecting terms and rearranging shows that this holds if and only if ln (1 + ζ)γ
< (1 + ζ)γ−1, which in turn is satisfied if and only if (1 + ζ)γ < exp(1+ζ)γ−1. Now, using
the power series representation of the exponential function, we can conclude that the
latter inequality is true if and only if 0 <
P∞
n=2
[(1+ζ)γ−1]n
n! , which in turn can be rewritten
to
0 <
∞P
k=2
n
[(1 + ζ)γ − 1]2
ok
(2k)!
·
1 +
[(1 + ζ)γ − 1]
2k + 1
¸
.
It is easy to see that for any ζ > −1 all summands on the right-hand side are positive.
The latter inequality therefore holds true, and (19) follows, which in turn establishes the
results on the eﬀects of risk as stated above.
A.4.2. Increasing the jump size. Let ζ0 ∈ (−1,∞) and assume that λ ({ζ0}) > 0. If
we increase all jumps with size ζ0 by a factor κ > 0 (assuming that (1 + κ) ζ0 > −1), the
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underlying Le´vy process becomes10
xκ (t) ≡ x (t) +
R
{ζ0} κζq˜ (t, dζ) ,
where the corresponding Le´vy measure reads
λκ (ζ) =



0 for ζ = ζ0
λ (ζ) + λ (ζ0) for ζ = (1 + κ) ζ0
λ (ζ) otherwise
.
Then, due to Keynes-Ramsey rule (15), the optimal average consumption growth accord-
ing to xκ (t) obeys
dEcκ (t) /dt
cκ (t)
=
·
r (t)− ρ
γ
− 1
2
(1− γ)σ2
¸
dt
−1
γ
R∞
−1
£
(1 + ζ)− (1 + ζ)1−γ − γζ
¤
λκ (dζ) dt
=
dEc (t) /dt
c (t)
− 1
γ
[g (κ)− g (0)]λ ({ζ0}) dt,
where we set g (κ) ≡ [1 + (1 + κ) ζ0]− [1 + (1 + κ) ζ0]
1−γ − γ (1 + κ) ζ0. Hence, the sign
of the derivative of g (κ) determines whether a rise in the jump size increases or decreases
consumption growth. The derivative reads g0 (κ) = (1− γ)
£
1− (1 + (1 + κ) ζ0)
−γ¤ ζ0.
Now it is easy to see that, since (1 + κ) ζ0 was assumed to be greater than −1, g0 (κ) >
0 for γ < 1, g0 (κ) = 0 for γ = 1, and g0 (κ) < 0 for γ > 1. This shows that
(dEcκ (t) /dt) /cκ (t) is less than (dEc (t) /dt) /c (t) if γ < 1, equal if γ = 1, and greater if
γ > 1, which finally yields the aforementioned results on the eﬀects of risk.
10The following demonstration can be easily extended to the case in which jumps of (infinitely) many
sizes increase.
Part 3
Labor Income Uncertainty

CHAPTER 3
Optimal Saving Under Risk of Unemployment∗
Abstract. We consider a continuous-time optimum-consumption problem in which an
agent is exposed to both risk and uncertain spells of unemployment. The back and forth
in the employment status is properly modeled by a stochastic diﬀerential equation with
Poisson processes. The resulting stochastic income process gives rise to precautionary
saving which is decreasing in the level of wealth. We find that this excess saving jointly
with the jumps in labor income lead to consumption paths that are totally diﬀerent
from what we know from deterministic setups. In particular, there can be, dependent
on the interest rate, target saving or temporary poverty traps. We further find that
the uncertainty in the employment status raises the average (though not necessary the
actual) consumption growth.
JEL classification: C61; D11; E24
Keywords: Optimal consumption; Risk of unemployment; Labor income risk; Precau-
tionary Saving
∗Special thanks are due to Udo Broll, Jens Eisenschmidt, Klaus Wa¨lde, and seminar participants at
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1. Introduction
Uncertainty in labor income is a major concern of individuals. Theoretic and empirical
results show that such earnings uncertainty leads to precautionary saving as a kind of
personal insurance against bad income draws. This behavior increases not only individual
and aggregate wealth but also, at least in average, individual and aggregate consumption
growth. The theoretic basis for precautionary saving was established by Leland (1968)
and Sandmo (1970); important extensions were provided by, e.g., Kimball (1990a, 1990b).
The authors find that precautionary saving is associated with convexity of the marginal
utility (i.e., with a positive third derivative of the utility function), such as exhibited by,
for example, the widely used class of CRRA1 utility functions. Empirical studies confirm
the theoretic results. Caballero’s (1991) simulation, for example, conjectures that on the
aggregate level the excess wealth due to precautionary saving may account for as much
as 60 percent of U.S. household’s net worth. Similarly, Gourinchas and Parker (2001)
estimate precautionary wealth to be 65 percent of total liquid wealth. They find further
that in average four percent per annum of consumption growth at young ages is due to
precautionary motives. Though there are authors presenting less dramatic results (see,
e.g., Guiso et al., 1992, or Lusardi, 1998), precautionary saving is a widely accepted and
important issue of individuals’ behavior.2
A major source for the uncertainty in labor income is risk of unemployment and the
uncertain outcome of the job search process. In the paper at hand we therefore present
a continuous-time optimum-consumption problem in which an agent with CRRA prefer-
ences is exposed to both risk and uncertain spells of unemployment. We find that the
back and forth between job and unemployment leads through the channel of precaution-
ary saving to consumption trajectories that are totally diﬀerent from what we know from
deterministic setups. In particular, the usual rule that the agent (dis)saves whenever the
interest rate is greater (less) than the time preference does not hold anymore. Instead
we obtain, depending on the parameter settings, target saving, where the agent’s wealth
and consumption converge toward a target state, or temporary poverty traps in case the
agent’s employment history has been unlucky. Furthermore and not surprising in light
of the precautionary saving motive, we find that the uncertainty in labor income due to
risk of unemployment raises the average (though not necessarily the actual) consumption
1Constant relative risk aversion.
2The large diﬀerences in the estimated contribution of precautionary saving stem mainly from the
various variables employed in order to proxy earnings uncertainty.
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growth. As a consequence, if the interest rate is equal to the time preference rate –
which in absence of uncertainty leads to constant levels for both consumption and wealth
–, expected consumption expenditure and wealth always grow with a positive rate.
Beside the references mentioned above, there are many authors who are concerned
with the theory of the optimal saving behavior in presence of uncertain labor income, see,
e.g., Kimball and Mankiw (1989), Zeldes (1989), Carroll and Kimball (1996), Talmain
(1998), and Rendon (2006). Several authors even include a simultaneous portfolio choice,
see, e.g., Merton (1971), Svensson and Werner (1993), Duﬃe et al. (1997), and Lentz
and Tranæs (2005), or endogenize individual labor supply as, e.g., Bodie et al. (1992)
and Basak (1999). Still other authors, such as Deaton (1991) and Carroll (2004), add
liquidity constraints, which on its own lead to precautionary saving.
Most of the models describing earnings uncertainty are, however, not suitable for
capturing properly the back and forth between employment and unemployment. Some
authors simply assume (in discrete time) the income process to be given by i.i.d. random
shocks or to follow a geometric random walk, see, e.g., Zeldes (1989), Deaton (1991),
Aiyagari (1994), and Carroll (2001), while others describe (in continuous time) the income
process as a geometric Brownian motion, see, e.g., Merton (1971), Bodie et al. (1992),
and Duﬃe et al. (1997). To the best of our knowledge, only Lentz and Tranæs (2005)
and Rendon (2006) address and model risk of unemployment explicitly. They, however,
consider discrete-time models in which the agent chooses both consumption and, while
unemployed, job-search eﬀort which aﬀects the arrival rate of new job oﬀers. In neither
of these models the authors derive a closed-form solution.3 Lentz and Tranæs (2005)
provide instead implicit results on the interaction between wealth, saving, unemployment
spell, and search eﬀort, while Rendon (2006) determines the optimal policies and other
variables numerically.
While finishing the article at hand, a related, but independent work by Toche (2005)
was drawn to our attention. Toche (2005) considers an optimum-consumption problem
in continuous-time in which unemployment is assumed to be an absorbing state. That
3Finding a closed-form solution for optimum-saving problems with uncertain labor income is re-
stricted to special cases. These include models with exponential utility (see, e.g., Kimball and Mankiw,
1989), risk-neutral agents (see, e.g., Aghion and Howitt, 1992), perfect correlation of risky securities
and uncertain labor income (see, e.g., Merton, 1971), or a combination of these properties (see, e.g.,
Svensson and Werner, 1993). Approaches for numerical and analytical approximations to the solution
can be found in, e.g., Zeldes (1989) or Talmain (1998).
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means, once the agent has been laid oﬀ, he remains unemployed throughout the rest of
his life. This assumption is obviously a very unrealistic simplification since unemployed
persons usually find a new job again.
The present paper provides a more realistic modeling by allowing the agent to jump
back and forth between job and unemployment throughout his lifetime. Technically this
is achieved, by assuming the job state, or more precisely the associated income process,
to obey a stochastic diﬀerential equation driven by Poisson processes. This modeling is
not only more suitable in light of the random changes in the employment status but also
allows the rigorous use of the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation as a tool for tackling
the optimum-consumption problem.
Unfortunately, but not surprisingly, a closed-form solution cannot be derived. How-
ever, using previous work on the subject of precautionary saving, which includes many
of the aforementioned references, we obtain an analytical characterization of the optimal
consumption rule. Jointly with a suitable form of the Keynes-Ramsey rule, which is also
derived in this paper, these characterizations lead to interesting insights into the opti-
mal saving behavior. We find that some of our results, such as target saving in case of
employment, also hold (at least qualitatively) in the simple setup from Toche (2005). In
this context we may also refer to, e.g., Carroll (2001) who, too, proves the existence of a
target level of wealth, though for a diﬀerent setup as discussed above. Other findings, in
contrast, such as poverty traps, are new and only explainable with our specific modeling
of the labor income process.
The model is kept as simple as possible in order to identify the pure eﬀect of both
risk and uncertain spells of unemployment on the saving behavior, cf. also Toche (2005).
In detail, that means we do neither consider portfolio and leisure choice nor liquidity
constraints, i.e., the agent can borrow freely whenever he thinks it is useful to do so.
Furthermore we assume, unlike Lentz and Tranæs (2005) and Rendon (2006), both the
separation and the matching process to be exogenously given.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model.
In Section 3 we provide fundamental characteristics of the optimal consumption rule.
Subsequently, in Section 4, we derive the Keynes-Ramsey rule and analyze the resulting
diﬀerential systems. Section 5 presents and discusses the results on the saving behavior,
while in Section 6 we consider the average consumption growth. The last section finally
concludes.
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2. The model
We consider an agent who is at time t0 endowed with some initial wealth a0. At
each instant t ≥ t0 he is paid a wage rate w while working in a job at t, whereas, while
unemployed at t, he receives unemployment benefits b. For sake of simplicity, we assume
both b and w to be constants. The agent can spend his wealth at t, a (t), on either
consumption c (t) or investment that bears a constant interest rate r > 0. Then, wealth
changes according to
da (t) = [ra (t) + z (t)− c (t)] dt, (1)
where z (t) ∈ {b, w}. Whenever we find it useful in the following, we shall write ab (t) or
aw (t) instead of a (t) in order to distinguish between the two diﬀerent laws of motion that
wealth can obey with respect to the employment status. We abstract away from liquidity
constraint, which means that the agent, whenever necessary, can borrow without limit.
In case of unemployment, job oﬀers arrive Poisson distributed with an exogenous
matching rate λm > 0. We assume that the agent accepts any job oﬀer that arrives
during unemployment and that there is no on-the-job search.4 Let qm denote the Poisson
process that counts how often the agent has found a new job after unemployment. The
arrival rate of qm is λm in case of unemployment and 0 while the agent is working in a
job. That is, qm “stops” after it has jumped (i.e., a new job has been found) and starts
not until the agent has become unemployed again. The average unemployment spell is
thus 1/λm.
Similarly, while working in a job, the agent is laid oﬀ with a separation rate λs > 0,
and a Poisson process qs counts how often he has been separated from a firm. Again, qs
stops after it has jumped and starts again not until a jump of qm has occurred, i.e., the
agent has found a new job. Thus, the arrival rate of qs is λs in periods with job and 0
during unemployment, resulting in an average job duration of 1/λs.
Summarizing, the dynamics of z (t) can be described by the stochastic diﬀerential
equation
dz (t) = [w − z (t−)] dqm (t) + [b− z (t−)] dqs (t) , (2)
4The assumption that job oﬀers are always accepted is justified if the potential output of a vacancy
is suﬃciently high, or the unemployment benefits suﬃciently low, such that the wage (which is usually
achieved by bargaining between agent and firm) exceeds the agent’s reservation wage (which is mainly
determined by the amount of the unemployment benefits), cf. Pissarides (2000) or the survey of Rogerson
et al. (2004) and the references therein.
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where the initial income z (t0) = z0 ∈ {b, w} also indicates the initial employment status.
It turns out that z (t) is a two-state birth-death process with birth rate λm and death
rate λs, see, e.g., Ross (1983, Ch. 5). In the following we shall occasionally make use of
the properties of this special class of Markov jump processes.
Notice that with (2) we have expressed z (t) by a stochastic diﬀerential equation. As
mentioned in the introductory section most authors assume the income process either to
be given by i.i.d. distributed shocks or to follow a geometric random walk or Brownian
motion. Though such modeling may simplify the analysis, it is not at all suitable to mirror
the back and forth in the employment status. In addition, having z (t) described by a
stochastic diﬀerential equation allows a straightforward use of the dynamic programming
approach, i.e., of the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation, in order to tackle the following
maximization problem.5
We denote by Et the expectation operator conditional on information available at
time t, i.e., conditional on z (t) and a (t). Let the agent’s time preference rate be given
by the constant ρ > 0 and assume the planning horizon to be infinite. Then, given the
CRRA utility function
u (c) =
c1−σ − 1
1− σ , σ > 0, σ 6= 1,
6 (3)
the agent’s objective consists in maximizing his expected lifetime utility
U c(t) (z0, a0) = Et0
R∞
t0
e−ρ(t−t0)u (c (t)) dt (4)
subject to budget constraint (1) and labor income dynamics (2). Assume that an optimal
(Markov) consumption rule c (z, a) maximizing (4) exists. Then, the value function V
reads
V (z0, a0) ≡ U c(z,a) (z0, a0) = Et0
R∞
t0
e−ρ(t−t0)u (c (z (t) , a (t))) dt.7
3. Properties of the optimal consumption rule
Before studying the stated consumption problem more closely, we provide in the
present section some important properties of the optimal consumption rule c (z, a) and
the marginal prospensity to consume, ∂c (z, a) /∂a, which are illustrated in Figure 1. We
5Naturally, the dynamic programming approach also applies if the income process is a geometric
Brownian motion.
6The following also applies to the special case σ → 1, i.e. u (c) = log c.
7Since the dynamics of a (t) and z (t) do not explicitly depend on time t, the state space is completely
described be these two variables. Thus, as utility function (3) does not depend on time neither, we
conclude that neither U c, V and c are explicit functions of time.
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Figure 1. The optimal consumption rules c(b, a) and c(w, a).
first provide lower and upper bounds for c (z, a) and analyze then asymptotic behavior
and curvature.
In what follows we assume the agent to be in time t, and we denote future time by
T , where T ≥ t. In order to find bounds for c (z, a), we use that, as the third derivative
of utility function (3) is positive, there exists a motive for precautionary saving, see, e.g.,
Sandmo (1970) and Kimball (1990b). Thus, given current income z (t) = z, uncertainty
in future labor income z (T ) leads for any level of wealth to less consumption expenditure
than in a setting in which the agent receives the expected value of z (T ), denoted by
ωz (t, T ), rather than the actual, uncertain amount z (T ). In Appendix A.1.2 we show
that ωz (t, T ) depends on the current income z and that ωb (t, T ) < ωw (t, T ) for all T ≥ t.
The optimal consumption rule in absence of labor income uncertainty is thus diﬀerent
for either state z ∈ {b, w} and reads, see Appendix A.1.3,
cE (b, a) ≡
ρ− (1− σ) r
σ
¡
a+ Ωb
¢
(5)
if the agent is currently unemployed (i.e., z = b) and
cE (w, a) ≡
ρ− (1− σ) r
σ
(a+ Ωw) (6)
if he is currently working in job (i.e., z = w). Here,
Ωb ≡ rb+ λsb+ λmw
r (r + λs + λm)
(7)
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and
Ωw ≡ rw + λsb+ λmw
r (r + λs + λm)
(8)
stand for the present values of the expected future labor income ωz (t, T ) conditional
on z (t) = z = b and z (t) = z = w, respectively. The subscript “E” from cE shall
indicate that expected rather than actual labor income is considered. In order to obtain
economically meaningful results, i.e., positive consumption expenditures cE (z, a), we
assume that ρ− (1− σ) r > 0.
While with (5) and (6) we have obtained upper bounds for c (b, a) and c (w, a), re-
spectively, we get a lower bound by the optimal consumption rule cmin (a) for permanent
unemployment. It reads, see also Appendix A.1.3,
cmin (a) =
ρ− (1− σ) r
σ
µ
a+
b
r
¶
, (9)
where b/r stands for the present value of an infinite payment of unemployment benefits.
Summarizing, we have found that
cmin (a) < c (b, a) < cE (b, a) (10)
and
cmin (a) < c (w, a) < cE (w, a) , (11)
cf. also Figure 1. Notice that, as b < w, we get b/r < Ωb < Ωw, where here the diﬀerence
between Ωb and Ωw is not due to, e.g., more skills or experience the employed agent may
have acquired on the job, but rather only due to the underlying search mechanism, cf.
Appendix A.1.2.
An immediate conclusion from the fact that the agent if currently working can expect
to earn more over his lifetime than if he was currently unemployed is that c (w, a) >
c (b, a),8 and thus
χ (a) ≡ c (w, a)
c (b, a)
> 1.
8Notice that even though expected earnings were equal for each employment status, we would not
obtain equality here, since, as also stressed by many authors such as Kimball and Mankiw (1989),
Gourinchas and Parker (2002), or Toche (2005), agents cannot fully smooth consumption at points of
time at which labor income jumps randomly.
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We now turn to the asymptotic behavior and curvature of c (z, a) and ∂c (z, a) /∂a.
According to, e.g., Kimball (1990a, 1990b) the precautionary premium9 is decreasing in
the level of consumption c if absolute prudence −u000 (c) /u00 (c) is. A simple calculation
shows that our utility function (3) exhibits the latter property. Thus, since according
to Appendix A.3 the consumption good is normal, the precautionary premium is also
decreasing in the level of wealth a. Therefore, as the precautionary premium is the
rightward shift of the consumption function c (z, a) in comparison to cE (z, a) in response
to future income risk, we conclude that
lim
a→∞
[cE (z, a)− c (z, a)] = 0. (12)
Graphically, the latter limit means that both c (z, a)-curves approach the corresponding
cE (z, a)-line as the level of wealth increases, see Figure 1. This result is very intuitive.
The agent, when getting wealthier, can use his wealth increasingly as buﬀer against the
uncertainty in labor income, reducing therefore precautionary saving. At high levels of
wealth he thus behaves approximately as under certainty.
Strongly related to the latter arguments is a further conclusion drawn from Kimball
(1990a, 1990b): The marginal prospensity to consume, ∂c (z, a) /∂a, is decreasing in the
level of wealth a. In other words, the optimal consumption rule c (z, a) is concave in a and
∂2c (z, a) / (∂a)2 < 0, z ∈ {b, w}. Additionally, we obtain that the marginal prospensity
to consume increases in the level of uncertainty in labor income. Looking at (5) and (6),
we thus conclude that
∂c (z, a)
∂a
>
∂cE (z, a)
∂a
=
ρ− (1− σ) r
σ
, 10 (13)
and, jointly with the aforementioned monotonicity of ∂c(z,a)∂a ,
∂c (z, a)
∂a
& ρ− (1− σ) r
σ
> 0 as a→∞.
9The precautionary premium is the certain reduction in total wealth that has the same eﬀect on the
optimal consumption value as the addition of future labor income uncertainty. It is hence the rightward
shift of the consumption function c (z, a) in comparison to cE (z, a), see, e.g., Kimball (1990a).
10Kimball (1990a, 1990b) actually shows that at any given level of consumption c, higher uncertainty
raises the marginal prospensity to consume. That is, (13) holds for identical levels of consumption
c = c (z, a1) = cE (z, a2) but, presumably, not for the same levels of wealth (i.e., a1 6= a2). But since the
right-hand side of inequality (13) is a constant, the inequality also holds for diﬀerent levels of consumption
and thus for all a > ab.
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For related setups, though with diﬀerent modelings of earnings uncertainty, several
authors obtain similar results on the optimal consumption rule by either analytical studies
(e.g., Carroll and Kimball, 1996, Duﬃe et al., 1997, and Carroll, 2004) or numerical
determinations of the optimal consumption rule (e.g., Zeldes, 1989, Deaton, 1991, and
Toche, 2005). Empirical evidence for the concavity of the consumption rule is provided
by, e.g., Lusardi (1996) and Souleles (1999).
We now consider the origins of the c (b, a)- and c (w, a)-curve. Combining (5)-(11), or
simply looking at Figure 1, leads to the conclusion that there exist levels of wealth, ab and
aw with −Ωw < aw < ab < −Ωb, at which the corresponding consumption expenditures
c
¡
b, ab
¢
and c (w, aw), respectively, are equal to zero. In order to avoid the problem that
c (b, a) may not be well defined for a < ab and also since in Section 5 it turns out that, if
starting with levels of wealth greater than ab, the agent chooses consumption in such a
way that wealth always remains above ab, we consider throughout the paper only levels
of wealth greater than ab.
A further conclusion drawn from (5)-(11) is that lima→∞ c (z, a) /a = [ρ− (1− σ) r] /σ
and that therefore,
lim
a→∞
χ (a) = lim
a→∞
c (w, a) /a
c (b, a) /a
= 1. (14)
This result, jointly with χ (a) > 1 for all a > ab and lima→ab χ (a) = ∞, suggests
that χ0 (a) < 0 for all a > ab which again mirrors the decreasing eﬀect of labor in-
come uncertainty as the level of wealth rises. From χ0 (a) < 0 we obtain easily that
∂c (b, a) /∂a > ∂c (w, a) /∂a, i.e., the marginal prospensity to consume is greater under
unemployment than under employment. This again is a very plausible result since an
extra Euro loosens the agent’s budget constraint more if he is currently unemployed than
if he was currently working in a job since, as discussed before, being unemployed means
less expected future labor income (ωb (t, T ) < ωw (t, T )), cf. also Appendix A.1.2.
4. Derivation of the optimal behavior
4.1. The Keynes-Ramsey rule. Using the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equa-
tion, we present in the following a stochastic form of the Keynes-Ramsey rule, which tells
us how the optimal consumption process changes over time. Supposed that the value
function and the optimal consumption rule are suﬃciently smooth, the HJB equation
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reads according to Sennewald (2007)11
ρV (z, a) = max
c≥0
(
u (c) + [ra+ z − c]Va (z, a)
+λs [V (b, a)− V (z, a)] + λm [V (w, a)− V (z, a)]
)
, (15)
where Va stands for the partial derivative of V with respect to a, and the maximum on
the right-hand side is attained by the optimal consumption expenditure c (z, a). The
Keynes-Ramsey rule, which is derived in Appendix A.2, reads then
dc (z (t) , a (t))
c (z (t−) , a (t))
=



r − ρ
σ
+ λs
h
c(z(t),a(t))
c(b,a(t))
iσ
− 1
σ
+ λm
h
c(z(t),a(t))
c(w,a(t))
iσ
− 1
σ


 dt
+
·
c (b, a (t))
c (z (t−) , a (t))
− 1
¸
dqs (t) +
·
c (w, a (t))
c (z (t−) , a (t))
− 1
¸
dqm (t) . (16)
Thus, the optimal consumption process of the agent when unemployed is described by
dc
¡
b, ab (t)
¢
c (b, ab (t))
=
"
r − ρ
σ
− λm
1− χ
¡
ab (t)
¢−σ
σ
#
dt+
£
χ
¡
ab (t)
¢
− 1
¤
dqm (t) ,
whereas during employment optimal consumption follows
dc (w, aw (t))
c (w, aw (t))
=
·
r − ρ
σ
+ λs
χ (aw (t))σ − 1
σ
¸
dt−
£
1− χ (aw (t))−1
¤
dqs (t) .
Keynes-Ramsey rule (16) tells us how optimal consumption changes over time. The
left-most term on the right-hand side, (r − ρ) /σ, is the deterministic part of the overall
growth rate. It is equal to the growth rate of the consumption process cE (z, azE (t))
induced by the optimal consumption rules (5) and (6), respectively, that are obtained for
the deterministic setting described in Section 3 and the underlying wealth process azE (t)
obeying
dazE (t) = [ra
z
E (t) + rΩ
z − cE (z, azE (t))] dt, (17)
cf. Appendix A.1.4. Here, z = z (t) denotes the current employment status. The sub-
script “E” shall again indicate that we here consider the expected instead of the actual
labor income.
The term (r − ρ) /σ shows that the usual properties for deterministic setups carry over
to the stochastic problem at hand. That is, the higher the interest rate r, or the lower
the time preference rate ρ and the risk aversion parameter σ, the more consumption the
individual sacrifices today for consumption tomorrow which yields higher consumption
11The reader may alternatively resort to Chapter 1 of this thesis, which provides a reproduction of
Sennewald (2007).
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growth, i.e., dc (z (t) , a (t)) /c (z (t−) , a (t)) goes up. Further economic insights derived
from the stochastic parts in Keynes-Ramsey rule (16) are provided later on in Section 5.
4.2. The reduced form. In order to obtain more insights into the optimal behavior,
it is useful to distinguish between the two employment states the individual can be in.
As long as the employment situation does not change, Keynes-Ramsey rule (16) shows
that the optimal consumption path does not jump and that it is diﬀerentiable from the
right. In case of unemployment and as long as the agent remains unemployed, optimal
consumption grows thus with the rate
dc
¡
b, ab (t)
¢
c (b, ab (t))
=
"
r − ρ
σ
− λm
1− χ
¡
ab (t)
¢−σ
σ
#
dt, (18)
where wealth obeys
dab (t) =
£
rab (t) + b− c
¡
b, ab (t)
¢¤
dt. (19)
Analogously, as long as the agent is working in a job, optimal consumption growth is
given by
dc (w, aw (t))
c (w, aw (t))
=
·
r − ρ
σ
+ λs
χ (aw (t))σ − 1
σ
¸
dt, (20)
and wealth accumulates according to
daw (t) = [raw (t) + w − c (w, aw (t))] dt. (21)
We call (18) and (20) the reduced forms of Keynes-Ramsey rule (16). Recalling that
χ (a) = c (w, a) /c (b, a), we see that each pair of corresponding diﬀerential equations, (18)
together with (19) and (20) joint with (21), represents a under-determined diﬀerential
system in t with three unknown functions of time, c
¡
b, ab (t)
¢
, c
¡
w, ab (t)
¢
, and ab (t) for
(18), (19) and c (b, aw (t)), c (w, aw (t)), and aw (t) for (20), (21). That means, even if we
knew, say, the initial consumption expenditures c (b, a0) and c (w, a0), respectively, the
systems would not be very helpful in determining the optimal consumption paths or rules.
In the following subsection we shall therefore show how on the basis of the diﬀerentials
(18)-(21) we can derive a diﬀerential system with two unknowns and two equations.
Notice that, unfortunately, the systems (18), (19) and (20), (21) cannot be considered
simultaneously nor can the reduced forms (18) and (20) be “linked” by, for example, sim-
ply equating the ratios χ
¡
ab (t)
¢
and χ (aw (t)). The reason is that the underlying wealth
processes in (18) and (20) follow diﬀerent laws of motion, namely (19) and (21), respec-
tively. Therefore the consumption process c
¡
w, ab (t)
¢
in (18), which is the numerator of
χ
¡
ab (t)
¢
, does in general not obey (20), as well as c (b, aw (t)) in (20), the denominator of
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χ (aw (t)), is not driven by (18). To be more explicit, consider, for example, c
¡
w, ab (t)
¢
in (18). While c
¡
w, ab (t)
¢
is the optimal consumption decision under the assumption of
employment, wealth ab (t) changes according to unemployment, hence as in (19). Thus,
as the consumption rule c (w, a) is a “fixed” mapping a 7→ c (w, a), c ¡w, ab (t)¢ in (18)
can, as a function of time, not exhibit the same law of motion as c (w, aw (t)) in (20),
where wealth changes as in (21), which finally triggers the aforementioned diﬃculties.
4.3. Consumption given by a system of deterministic diﬀerential equa-
tions in a. This subsection provides a method how to condense the under-determined
diﬀerential systems (18), (19) and (20), (21) in order to obtain a two-dimensional diﬀer-
ential system with two unknown functions. More precisely, applying the time-elimination
method on (18)-(21), we show that the optimal consumption rules c (b, a) and c (w, a)
solve a two-dimensional system of deterministic diﬀerential equations in a. Though not
being of great use in the following analysis, this result may be the starting point for a
numerical approximation to the optimal consumption rules. This step, however, is left
for further research, and the reader not interested in this subject may skip the present
subsection.
As long as the employment status z does not change and daz (t) 6= 0 (i.e., c (z, az (t)) 6=
raz (t)+z), the time-elimination methods yields that the marginal prospensity to consume
at time t, ∂c (z, az (t)) /∂a, is given by the ratio of the time-diﬀerentials dc (z, az (t)) and
daz (t),12
∂c (z, az (t))
∂a
=
dc (z, az (t))
daz (t)
. (22)
Thus, for the case of unemployment we obtain by inserting the consumption growth
rate (18) and the equation of wealth accumulation (19) that for any a > ab with c (b, a)
6= ra+ b,
∂c (b, a)
∂a
=
r−ρ
σ − λm
1−χ(a)−σ
σ
ra+ b− c (b, a) c (b, a) . (23)
In analogy, now using (20) and (21), the marginal prospensity to consume for the job
case reads
∂c (w, a)
∂a
=
r−ρ
σ + λs
χ(a)σ−1
σ
ra+ w − c (w, a)c (w, a) . (24)
12The time-elimination method employs the chain rule of diﬀerentiation which yields that
the time evolution of the optimal consumption process c (z, az (t)) is given by dc (z, az (t)) =
[∂c (z, az (t)) /∂a] daz (t). Dividing by daz (t) 6= 0 yields Equation (22).
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Hence, recalling that χ (a) = c (w, a) /c (b, a), the optimal consumption rules c (b, a) and
c (w, a) are a solution to the system of deterministic diﬀerential equations in a given by
(23) and (24). The terminal condition is the convergence property (12).
Note that due to the imposed condition az (t) 6= 0 (or equivalently c (z, a) 6= ra + z)
the agent must be either saving or dissaving if we wish to apply (22). However, as the
consumption good is normal and thus 0 < ∂c (z, a) /∂a < ∞ for all a > ab, we know
that the diﬀerential system (23), (24) does not explode at levels azr of wealth at which the
optimal consumption spending is equal to total income, i.e., at which c (z, azr) = ra
z
r+z.
13
A numerical approach would nevertheless require a very cautious proceeding at these
points since the denominators in (23) and (24) tend toward zero as a moves toward abr
and awr , respectively, which may lead to numerical distortions.
5. Results I: Saving and dissaving between jumps
Starting from the reduced forms (18) and (20) and the budget constraints (19) and
(21) we consider in the present section the saving behavior in each employment status
more closely. It turns out that for interest rates less then the time preference rate the
agent, while unemployed, always dissaves, whereas, while working in a job, he saves at
little wealth but dissaves when wealthy. That means during employment wealth tends
toward a certain target level. If the interest rate is equal to the time preference rate,
the agent always dissaves while unemployed, but always saves while working in a job.
For interest rates above the time preference rate, the agent always saves while working
in a job, whereas, while unemployed, he dissaves at low levels of wealth and saves when
wealthy. Only for very high interest rates, the agent always saves, for either employment
status and any level of wealth.
5.1. First conclusions. A first result is derived directly from the reduced forms
(18) and (20). As χ (a) > 1, we deduce that
dc
¡
b, ab (t)
¢
c (b, ab (t))
<
r − ρ
σ
<
dc (w, aw (t))
c (w, aw (t))
. (25)
Recall from Subsection 4.1 that (r − ρ) /σ is the optimal consumption growth rate in
absence of labor income uncertainty (i.e., the agent receives the expected rather than the
13For the existence of azr , see Proposition 1. There it turns out that both the existence and the level
of azr depend on the interest rate r. Therefore, the subscript “r” at a
z
r .
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actual, uncertain labor income). With Appendix A.1.4 we can thus conclude that
dc
¡
b, ab (t)
¢
c (b, ab (t))
<
dcE
¡
b, abE (t)
¢
cE
¡
b, abE (t)
¢ and dc (w, aw (t))
c (w, aw (t))
>
dcE (w, awE (t))
cE (w, awE (t))
, (26)
where cE (z, a) is given by (5) and (6), respectively, and azE (t) obeys diﬀerential (17). The
inequalities in (26) show that in case of unemployment consumption grows more slowly
than in the corresponding deterministic setup, while it grows faster when the agent is
working in a job. The first result, concerning unemployment, seems to be somehow
paradox given the presence of precautionary saving which actually should increase con-
sumption growth due to the following mechanism. As the agent faces uncertainty in labor
income, he reduces present consumption (i.e., c (z, a) < cE (z, a)) in order to protect him-
self against long unemployment spells and short job durations. As a consequence, wealth
accumulates faster which yields, jointly with a higher marginal prospensity to consume
than in the deterministic setting (see Section 3), higher consumption growth.
But the contribution of precautionary saving is only one part of the story. A second
eﬀect stems from the diﬀerent levels of labor income that contribute to the accumulation
of wealth underlying the processes c (z, az (t)) and cE (z, azE (t)). While a
z (t) accumulates
according to (19) (when z = b) or (21) (when z = w), azE (t) obeys (17). Now, looking at
these diﬀerentials, we can see that beside the diﬀerent consumption expenditures also dif-
ferent levels of labor income aﬀect the accumulation of wealth and therefore consumption
growth.
To explain things more precisely, consider first the case of unemployment. Here, the
agent earns unemployment benefits b. In the corresponding deterministic setup, on the
other hand, he would earn the amount rΩb, which is, as a simple calculation using (7)
shows, greater than b. Thus, looking at the diﬀerentials (17) and (19), we can immediately
conclude that ab (t) accumulates ceteris paribus more slowly than abE (t). That in turn
leads, again ceteris paribus, to less consumption growth during unemployment compared
to the deterministic benchmark case. This eﬀect is so strong that it even outweighs the
increase in consumption growth that is due to precautionary saving, which explains the
“paradox” result stated in the first inequality of (26).
An analogous story holds for the job case, i.e., the second inequality in (26). But,
since here labor income w is greater than average earnings rΩw, the precautionary saving
eﬀect is even amplified and consumption always grows faster than in the deterministic
setting. Later, in Section 6 we shall see that in average risk of unemployment in fact
always increases consumption growth.
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We now turn back to inequality (25). Since the consumption good is normal and labor
income is constant between jumps, consumption growth is positive iﬀ the accumulation
of wealth is positive, i.e., iﬀ the agent is saving. Inequality (25) leads therefore directly
to the following lemma.
Lemma 1. If r < ρ, the unemployed agent always dissaves. If r > ρ, the agent while
working in a job always saves.
5.2. Deeper results. We now provide a more detailed discussion on the agent’s
saving behavior. The following proposition first presents more precise analytical results.
For the proof we combine the lemmas presented in Appendices A.4.1 and A.4.2.
Proposition 1. (1) If 0 < r < ρ, the agent always dissaves during unemploy-
ment. For the job case there exists a target level of wealth, awr > a
b, which is
increasing in the interest rate r and toward which the agent’s wealth converges
as long as he is working in a job. That means, while working in a job, the agent
saves for all a < awr , dissaves for all a > a
w
r , and spends his total income on
consumption at awr , i.e., c (w, a
w
r ) = ra
w
r +w. In addition, we find limr&0 a
w
r ≥ ab
and limr%ρ awr =∞.
(2) If r = ρ, the agent, while unemployed, dissaves, whereas, while working in a job,
he saves .
(3) If ρ < r < ρ + λm, the agent always saves while working in a job. For the case
of unemployment, there exists a level abr > a
b of wealth which is decreasing in r
and exhibits the following properties. While unemployed, the agent dissaves for
all a < abr, saves for all a > a
b
r, and spends his total income on consumption at
abr, i.e., c
¡
b, abr
¢
= rabr + b. In addition, limr&ρ a
b
r =∞ and limr%ρ+λm awr = ab.
(4) If r ≥ ρ+ λm, the agent always saves for each employment status and any level
of wealth.
Point 1 from the proposition, where r < ρ, is illustrated in Figure 2.14 Here exists
with (awr , c (w, a
w
r )) a stable target state for the job case toward which the agent’s wealth
and consumption converges during employment. The existence of such target levels was
also shown by, e.g., Carroll (2001) and Toche (2005), but there, as mentioned before,
using models that are not suitable for our purposes.
14Using similar arguments as in Remark 3 from Appendix A.4.1 would show that the position of the
curves under consideration is indeed as depicted in Figure 2.
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Figure 2. Saving behavior if r < ρ
Let us consider a typical path for wealth and consumption. Assume the agent initially
be endowed with some wealth a0 > awr and working in a job. Then he chooses consumption
c (w, a0) and starts in the a-c space in point p0 ≡ (a0, c (w, a0)) on the c (w, a)-curve. As
right from the target level awr the zero-motion line for a
w (t), depicted by the upper
dotted line labeled by daw (t) = 0, lies above the c (w, a)-curve, the agent dissaves at
a0. Thus, wealth and therefore consumption decrease and a and c move left-down on
the c (w, a)-curve until, say, ps,−1 where the agent is separated from his job for the first
time. Consumption jumps then downwards and the system jumps to ps1 on the c (b, a)-
curve. Now, being unemployed, the agent dissaves (the zero-motion line for ab (t), the
lower dotted line, always lies below the c (b, a)-curve). Wealth and consumption therefore
decrease further, now along the c (b, a)-curve, until point pm,−1 where the agent finds a
new job. Then consumption jumps upwards and the system jumps from pm,−1 to p
m
1 , back
on the c (w, a)-curve. Now, wealth is below the target level awr , and the agent saves so
that wealth and consumption move upwards until, say, ps,−2 where he is laid oﬀ again.
As before, consumption jumps downwards and the system jumps from ps,−2 to p
s
2, and so
forth. We see that, even though starting out above the target level awr , the agent finds
himself in the space southwest of (awr , c (w, a
w
r )) after some time. Once arrived there, he
always saves while working in a job, moving toward (awr , c (w, a
w
r )), whereas he always
dissaves while unemployed.
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We now consider more closely the change in the sign of saving and of consumption
growth at the target level awr . An algebraic derivation was provided in Appendix A.4.2.
But how can we explain this result economically? For sake of clarity we first focus
on saving and turn then to consumption growth. Observe that without labor income
uncertainty (i.e., the agent would earn the expected instead of the actual labor income)
the agent had little incentive to save since r < ρ. For any a > ab and for speculative
purposes only he would hence dissave the amount kra+ rΩw − cE (w, a)k and the optimal
consumption process cE (w, awE (t)) would decrease with the constant rate kr − ρk /σ;15 a
target level would not exist. But risk and uncertain spells of unemployment force the
agent to precautionary saving. In addition, when employed, his earnings are in each
period above the average since w > rΩw, which, compared to the deterministic setting,
increases saving further by the amount w − rΩw.
Now observe that, on the one hand, speculative dissaving due to r < ρ increases
as wealth increases. On the other, the wealthier the agent, the lower the amount of
precautionary saving, i.e., the less the agent needs to care about the uncertainty in
labor income since wealth serves as a buﬀer against bad income shocks, see Section
3. Summarizing, we thus see that at low levels of wealth the additional saving due to
precautionary purposes and excess labor income is large enough in relation to the amount
of speculative dissaving such that the agent’s total saving becomes positive. However, as
wealth increases, the amount of speculative dissaving increases too, while precautionary
saving decreases and the impact of the excess labor income w − rΩw diminishes.16 As a
result, there exists a level of wealth, namely awr , at which speculative dissaving is exactly
oﬀset by the additional saving due to precautionary purposes and excess labor income.
At levels greater than awr speculative dissaving then outweighs the additional saving, and
the agent hence dissaves.
A similar story holds for consumption growth dc (w, aw (t)) /c (w, aw (t)). Here we
know from Subsection 5.1 that due to both precautionary saving and excess labor income
w−rΩw, consumption during employment grows with a rate above the deterministic rate
(r − ρ) /σ. But applying the same arguments as before and considering the positive mar-
ginal prospensity to consume, we find that consumption growth is positive at low levels
of wealth, where the impact of both precautionary saving and the excess labor income is
15See Appendix A.1.4.
16Observe here that w − rΩw is a constant with respect to wealth.
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Figure 3. Saving behavior if ρ < r < ρ+ λm
strong, while consumption growth is negative with a rate close to the deterministic rate
(r − ρ) /σ if the agent is more wealthy.17
Observe that, as the interest rate r approaches the time preference rate ρ, the level
awr moves rightward toward ∞. That means that, if r moves toward ρ, which increases
the agent’s incentive to save, the agent will, unless he is very wealthy, always save while
working in a job. This behavior is similar to the one described in point 2 from the
proposition, where r = ρ. Here the employed agent saves even if he is very wealthy.
We now focus on point 3 where ρ < r < ρ+λm and which is illustrated in Figure 3.18
Here we have with abr an unstable steady state for the case of unemployment. Figure 3
shows that the agent can find himself trapped in poverty. Assume he is initially working,
but not too wealthy such that a0 < abr. As long as he stays in his job, he saves, starting
in p0 ≡ (a0, c (b, a0)), and wealth and consumption move up-right on the c (w, a)-curve.
Assume the agent is laid oﬀ before reaching abr, say at p
s,−
1 . Then consumption jumps
downwards and the system jumps to ps1 on the c (b, a)-curve. Now, the agent dissaves
in order to maintain a certain level of consumption, and wealth as well as consumption
decline during the current unemployment spell, until he finds a new job again at, say,
pm,−1 . Then, consumption jumps upwards and the agent can, starting out of p
m
1 , save
17Notice that combining (14), (20), and χ0 (a) < 0 clearly shows that the consumption growth rate
tends from above toward the deterministic rate (r − ρ) /σ.
18Again, using similar arguments as in Remark 3 from Appendix A.4.1 would confirm that the
position of the curves under consideration is indeed as drawn in Figure 3.
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again. But, as before, he may loose his job before reaching abr. That means, if the agent’s
employment history turns out to be unfortunate, he does not escape from poverty. On
the other hand, looking at another possible sequence, p0 → qs,−1 → qs1 → q
m,−
1 → qm1 , we
find that once the agent has stayed a suﬃciently long time in job, such that he has been
able to accumulate wealth beyond abr when being laid oﬀ, he will always save, even during
unemployment. That means, if the agent’s wealth is greater than abr, he still becomes
more wealthier, regardless of his job situation. Later on, in the subsequent section we
show that in average the agent’s consumption and thus wealth always grow if r ≥ ρ. In
the long run, the agent will therefore always escape from poverty.
In analogy to the case of the target level awr from point 1, we here also explain the
change in the sign of saving and consumption growth at the unstable steady state abr. As
r > ρ, the agent’s incentive to save is high and he would always save in absence of earnings
uncertainty. On the one hand, this speculative saving is amplified by precautionary
saving, which is decreasing in the level of wealth. On the other hand, since unemployment
benefits b are below the average earnings rΩb, saving is reduced by the amount rΩb − b.
At low levels of wealth, this reduction in saving is large enough to outweigh speculative
and precautionary saving, and the agent dissaves. But, as wealth increases the impact of
rΩb − b on total saving diminishes. There exists thus a point, namely abr, at which this
diﬀerence is equal to speculative and precautionary saving, and wealth and consumption
remain constant over time. For levels of wealth higher than abr the agent then always
saves. In analogy to point 1 a discussion on the change in the sign of consumption
growth is now straightforward.
We now turn to point 4 from the proposition. Here, we will hardly observe the
required parameter constellation r ≥ ρ + λm in reality. Clark and Summers (1979), for
example, suggests that an average spell of unemployment lasts between 3.5 to 4 months,
which yields a matching rate of about λm = 0.25 annually. On the other hand, estimated
time preference rates typically range between 0.01 (one percent) and 0.05 (five percent)
annually, see, e.g., Skinner (1988) or Engen and Gruber (2001). Hence, in order to satisfy
r ≥ ρ + λm, the real interest rate needs to be greater than about 0.25, i.e., 25 percent.
But which safe investment strategy yields such high returns?
Observe that the previous results on the agent’s saving behavior diﬀer fundamentally
from what we know from deterministic setups. There, the agent always saves (dissaves)
if the interest rate r is greater (less) than the time preference rate ρ, while for r = ρ
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he always spends his total income on consumption, leading to constant levels of both
consumption and wealth.
6. Results II: The average consumption growth
In the present section we show that risk of unemployment leads to higher average (or
expected) consumption growth than in the deterministic setup. With Keynes-Ramsey
rule (16), the expected growth rate of the optimal consumption process at some future
time conditional on the initial wealth and employment status reads, see Appendix A.5,
Et0
dc (z (t) , a (t))
c (z (t) , a (t))
=



r−ρ
σ + λsp
w
z0 (t0, t)
n
Et0
χ(a(t))σ−1
σ − Et0
£
1− χ (a (t))−1
¤o
+λmpbz0 (t0, t)
n
Et0 [χ (a (t))− 1]− Et0
1−χ(a(t))−σ
σ
o 
 dt,
(27)
where pzz0 (t0, t), the probability of being at time t in job status z when being at t0 in z0, is
given in (28)-(31) in Appendix A.1.1. The terms in braces on the right-hand side that are
in addition to the deterministic growth rate (r − ρ) /σ are strictly positive, see Lemma
6 in Appendix A.5. Thus, the average consumption growth under risk of unemployment
is greater than for deterministic setups where future labor income is deterministic and
given by the expectation of z (t), ωz0 (t).
This finding mirrors the precautionary saving motive. Facing not only the risk but also
the uncertain duration of unemployment, a prudent agent sacrifices some consumption
today to protect himself against possible future losses in labor income (i.e., when he
becomes unemployed or remains a long time in unemployment). This behavior yields in
average ever lasting growth of consumption and wealth if the interest rate is equal to
(or greater than) the time preference, which in deterministic setups only leads to zero
growth. Unfortunately, there is no such an unambiguous result if the interest rate is less
than the time preference rate. However, the finding that here the consumption process
after some time will only range between zero and the target-level c (w, awr ) (cf. Figure 2
in Subsection 5.2) suggests that there might exists interest rates less than ρ such that
average consumption growth becomes zero after some time and that therefore there might
exist a steady state distribution for the consumption process.
7. Conclusion
We have studied the optimal saving behavior of an agent who faces not only risk but
also uncertain duration of unemployment. We have found that precautionary saving,
which is decreasing in the level of wealth, leads to a diﬀerent saving behavior than in
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the deterministic setup: (i) If the interest rate is less than the time preference rate, the
agent while working in a job saves at little wealth and dissaves when wealthy, toward a
target level of wealth, whereas while unemployed he always dissaves. (ii) If the interest
rate is equal to the time preference rate, he saves while employed and dissaves while
unemployed. (iii) In case of interest rates greater than the time preference rate, the
agent while unemployed dissaves at low level of wealth and saves when wealthy, whereas
while working in a job, he always saves. Here the agent may be temporarily trapped in
poverty.
The average consumption growth turns out to be always greater than in the determin-
istic setup. That implies that, if the interest rate is equal to (or greater than) the time
preference rate – what in deterministic setups leads to zero-growth –, consumption and
wealth grow here in average always with a positive rate.
In a next step one could attempt to derive a numerical approximation to the optimal
consumption rule, using the diﬀerential system presented in Subsection 4.3. Interesting
extensions might be to introduce risky assets as investment alternative (that may be
correlated with the risk of unemployment and the job matching process) or to endogenize
both the agent’s labor supply as well as his eﬀort to find a new job while unemployed.
These issues, however, are left for further research.
A. Appendix
A.1. The optimal consumption rule if labor income is deterministic . The
objective of the present subsection is to find closed-form expressions for the optimal con-
sumption rules cE (b, a), cE (w, a), and cmin (a). Here, cE (z, a) is the optimal consumption
expenditure if future labor income is given by the expected value of z (T ) conditional on
currently being either unemployed (z = b) or working in a job (z = w), while cmin (a) is
the optimal consumption rule under the assumption of permanent unemployment. We
first determine in Subsection A.1.1 the probabilities of being employed and unemployed in
the future, calculate then in Subsection A.1.2 the expected labor income and its present
value, and derive finally, in Subsection A.1.3, the closed-form expressions for cE (b, a),
cE (w, a), and cmin (a). Some important remarks on the deterministic consumption pro-
cesses induced by cE (b, a) and cE (w, a) are added in Subsection A.1.4.
A.1.1. The Kolmogorov probabilities of z (t). As mentioned in the main text, z (t) can
be considered as a two-state birth-death process. That allows us to apply Kolmogorov’s
Forward Equation in order to determine the distribution of future earnings. Let t ≥ t0
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be current and T ≥ t future time. Then we denote the probability of receiving in the
future (at time T ) income z˜ when currently (at t) receiving z by
pz˜z (t, T ) ≡ P (z (T ) = z˜|z (t) = z) ≡ E
£
1{z(T )=z˜}|z (t) = z
¤
.
Following Ross (1983, Ex. 5.4(a)), we find that for the two states of z (T ), b and w, these
conditional probabilities read
pbb (t, T ) =
λs
λs + λm
+
λm
λs + λm
e−(λs+λm)(T−t), (28)
pwb (t, T ) =
λm
λs + λm
− λm
λs + λm
e−(λs+λm)(T−t) (29)
if z (t) = b and
pbw (t, T ) =
λs
λs + λm
− λs
λs + λm
e−(λs+λm)(T−t), (30)
pww (t, T ) =
λm
λs + λm
+
λs
λs + λm
e−(λs+λm)(T−t) (31)
if z (t) = w. Notice that, for example, the expression pwb (t, T ) stands not only for the
probability of earning at T wage w when receiving unemployment benefits b at t, but also
for the probability of working in a job at T when currently being unemployed. Observe
that for any z ∈ {b, w}, pbz (t, T ) + pwz (t, T ) = 1. Furthermore note that, since the future
employment status z (T ) is independent of the level of wealth at t, pz˜z (t, T ) = Et1{z(T )=z}.
That means it is here the same whether we condition on both z (t) and a (t) or on z (t)
only. This result is generalized in the following remark.
Remark 1. Let f : z ∈ {b, w} 7→ f (z) ∈ R be a measurable function. Then,
E [f (z (T )) |z (t)] = Et [f (z (T ))].
A.1.2. The expected future labor income and its present value. We now turn to the
determination of the expected future labor income and its present value. Let, again,
T ≥ t. Then the expected future labor income (at T ) conditional on the current income
(at t) is denoted by ωz(t) (t, T ) ≡ E[z (T ) |z (t)] = Etz (T ), where for the second equal
sign we used Remark 1. As previously shown in Subsection A.1.1, the conditional future
labor income is two-state distributed with the conditional probabilities (28)-(31). Thus,
the conditional expected labor income reads ωz(t) (t, T ) = pbz(t) (t, T ) b+ p
w
z(t) (t, T )w and
therefore, if z (t) = b,
ωb (t, T ) =
λsb+ λmw − λm (w − b) e−(λs+λm)(T−t)
λs + λm
(32)
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while, if z (T ) = w,
ωw (t, T ) =
λsb+ λmw + λs (w − b) e−(λs+λm)(T−t)
λs + λm
.19 (33)
The latter equations show that the agent when currently employed can expect to receive
higher labor income in the future than when currently unemployed. Observe that this
result is not due to, e.g., more skills or experience he may have achieved on the job, but
rather only due to the underlying search mechanism. Consequently, we see that for large
time horizons the initial employment status becomes less and less important, and letting
T tend toward ∞ even yields
lim
T→∞
ωb (t, T ) = lim
T→∞
ωw (t, T ) =
λsb+ λmw
λs + λm
.
We now continue with the calculation of the present values at time T ≥ t, denoted
by Ωb (t, T ) and Ωw (t, T ), respectively. The present value of an arbitrary variable, but
deterministic flow of labor income z (T ), amounts to
Ω (T ) ≡
R∞
T e
−r(τ−T )z (τ) dτ . (34)
Inserting (32) and (33) into the latter formula yields (replace in (32) and (33) T with τ)
Ωb (t, T ) =
λsb+ λmw
r (λs + λm)
− λm (w − b)
(λs + λm) (r + λs + λm)
e−(λs+λm)(T−t) (35)
and
Ωw (t, T ) =
λsb+ λmw
r (λs + λm)
+
λs (w − b)
(λs + λm) (r + λs + λm)
e−(λs+λm)(T−t). (36)
Now observe that the stochastic income process z (t) as defined in (2) is Markovian and
that it therefore has no “memory”, which, in particular, means that the time elapsed since
the agent has become unemployed or employed for the last time is irrelevant for future
prospects. Thus, at which time t ever we look at the “system” and observe employment
status z ∈ {b, w}, the present values of expected labor income are always
Ωb ≡ Ωb (t, t) = rb+ λsb+ λmw
r (r + λs + λm)
(37)
and
Ωw ≡ Ωw (t, t) = rw + λsb+ λmw
r (r + λs + λm)
, (38)
respectively.
19Interestingly, we arrive at the same results if we form expectation Et on the stochastic diﬀerential
(2), apply further the martingale property of the Poisson processes (see Footnote 24 on p. 85), and solve
the resulting deterministic linear diﬀerential equation for Etz (T ).
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We can see that Ωz does not depend on current time t. In addition, and as already
suggested by the expected future labor income, we find that the agent when working in
a job can expect to earn more over his lifetime than when currently unemployed. The
diﬀerence reads Ωw−Ωb = w−br+λs+λm , and, again, it only stems from the underlying search
mechanism.
Remark 2. Interestingly, as a simple calculation shows, it is not the same whether the
agent who is currently, at t, say, working in a job receives either the expected labor income
ωw (t, T ) over the life cycle or first wage w for the expected duration of a job, 1/λs, then
unemployment benefits b for the expected unemployment spell, 1/λm, afterwards again w
for a period of length 1/λs, and so on. We must thus be careful with what we use as the
“deterministic world”.
A.1.3. The optimal consumption rules for the deterministic setting . Consider the
problem
max
c(T )≥0
R∞
t e
−ρ(T−t) c (T )
1−σ − 1
1− σ dT
subject to da (T ) = [ra (T ) + z (T )− c (T )] dT , where labor income z (T ) changes deter-
ministically over time. Applying the Hamiltonian approach or the HJB equation yields
jointly with the No-Ponzi game condition limT→∞ e−rTa (T ) = 0 the following closed-form
expression for the optimal consumption rule20
c (T, a) =
ρ− (1− σ) r
σ
[a+ Ω (T )] , (39)
where Ω (T ) stands for the present value of labor income, see (34).
In case of permanent unemployment the agent receives an infinitely lasting payment
amounting to b. The present value of this flow reads Ωmin ≡ b/r, which yields upon insert-
ing in (39) consumption rule (9). Analogously, the optimal consumption rule cE (t, T, z, a)
in case that labor income is given by the expected flow ωz (t, T ) reads then
cE (t, T, z, a) =
ρ− (1− σ) r
σ
[a+ Ωz (t, T )] , (40)
where Ωz (t, T ) is given by (35) and (36), respectively. Now, recall that the actual income
process z (t) is Markovian. The deterministic consumption rule cE (z, a) corresponding
to the rule under uncertainty, c (z, a) is thus obtained by setting in (40) T = t, and it
20The No-Ponzi game condition is a suﬃcient criterion for optimality, see, e.g., Wa¨lde (2006, Sec.
5.4).
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reads cE (z, a) =
ρ−(1−σ)r
σ [a+ Ω
z]. Inserting (37) and (38) finally yields the specific rules
(5) and (6), respectively.
A.1.4. The deterministic consumption process. Using the optimal consumption rule
for the deterministic setting, (5) and (6), respectively, we present in the following a budget
constraint to which this rule is optimal and which induces the same consumption process
as the system for the deterministic setting described in the previous subsections, given
by consumption rule (40) and budget constraint
dazE (T ) = [ra
z
E (T ) + ω
z (t, T )− czE (t, T, z, azE (T ))] dT, T ≥ t. (41)
Recall that z = z (t) denotes the employment status at time t. The objective of the
introduction of the alternative system is threefold. Observe that, while the actual labor
income process is Markovian and constant between jumps, the expectation ωz (t, T ) de-
pends on the time elapsed since t, which, for example if z = b, can be the last time the
agent has been laid oﬀ. Thus, when we explain the diﬀerences between the consumption
growth rate obtained in the stochastic setting and the growth rate obtained in the deter-
ministic setting (see, e.g., Subsection 5.1, p. 67), conclusions may be interfered by the
following facts: (i) ωz (t, T ) continuously changes over time T , and it does not “update”
information; (ii) the optimal consumption rule (40) depends trough ωz (t, T ) on the time
span T − t, which means that in absence of uncertainty and holding all other variables
equal, the agent behaves diﬀerently at t than at some T > t, which is not the case in the
stochastic setting; (iii) a positive saving in the deterministic setting (i.e., dazE (T ) > 0)
does not necessarily mean positive consumption growth (i.e., dcE (t, T, z, azE (T )) > 0)
and vice versa, as we observe in the stochastic setting. In other words, the deterministic
system as it stands is not “comparable” with the stochastic system.
The new system solves those problems. It is given by the consumption rules (5)
and (6), respectively, and budget constraint (17).21,22 We use here that under certainty
the agent does not consider current labor income but rather its present value when tak-
ing a consumption decision. In order to show that the resulting consumption process
cE (z, azE (T )) is equal to the consumption process cE (t, T, z, a
z
E (T )) induced by (40) and
(41) we notice first that at “initial” time T = t and since by construction azE (t) = a
z
E (t),
21Proceeding along the lines from Subsection A.1.3, one can show easily that the consumption rules
(5) and (6), respectively, are indeed optimal to budget constraint (17).
22Since neither the consumption rules (5) and (6) nor budget constraint (17) depend on the time
span T − t, we do not distinguish anymore between t and T whenever we deal with these formulas, and
we denote the time flow in the main text by t.
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cE (z, azE (t)) = cE (t, t, z, a
z
E (t)) and, second, that both processes grow with the same
rate (r − ρ) /σ, cf. Barro and Sala-i-Mart´ın (1995, Sec. 2.1). Combining both points
yields equality.
A.2. The Derivation of the Keynes-Ramsey rule. Consider HJB equation (15).
The first-order condition for the maximum on the right-hand side reads
u0 (c (z, a)) = Va (z, a) . (42)
That is, the optimal consumption for a given level of wealth a is always chosen such that
the marginal prospensity to consume is equal to the marginal value of a. Applying the
change-of-variables formula from Sennewald (2007, Th. 1), we obtain the time evolution
of the marginal value function
dVa (z (t) , a (t)) = {[ra (t) + z (t)− c (t)]Vaa (z (t) , a (t))} dt
+ [Va (b, a (t))− Va (z (t−) , a (t))] dqs (t)
+ [Va (w, a (t))− Va (z (t−) , a (t))] dqm (t) , (43)
where Vaa denotes the second order partial derivative of V with respect to a. Now, we
diﬀerentiate the maximized HJB equation (15) with respect to a, and we find, using the
envelope theorem, that
ρVa (z, a) = rVa (z, a) + [ra+ z − c (z, a)]Vaa (z, a)
+λs [Va (b, a)− Va (z, a)] + λm [Va (w, a)− Va (z, a)] ,
which gives upon rearranging
[ra+ z − c (z, a)]Vaa (z, a) = [ρ− r]Va (z, a)− λs [Va (b, a)− Va (z, a)]
−λm [Va (w, a)− Va (z, a)] .
Inserting the latter equation evaluated at z (t) and a (t) into diﬀerential (43) yields
dVa (z (t) , a (t)) =
(
[ρ− r]Va (z (t) , a (t))− λs [Va (b, a (t))− Va (z (t) , a (t))]
−λm [Va (w, a (t))− Va (z (t) , a (t))]
)
dt
+ [Va (b, a (t))− Va (z (t−) , a (t))] dqs (t)
+ [Va (w, a (t))− Va (z (t−) , a (t))] dqm (t) .
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Now, substituting Va (·) with u0 (·) according to the first-order condition (42), we find
that the marginal utility process obeys
− du
0(c(z(t),a(t)))
u0(c(z(t−),a(t))) =



r − ρ+ λs
h
u0(c(b,a(t)))
u0(c(z(t),a(t))) − 1
i
+λm
h
u0(c(w,a(t)))
u0(c(z(t),a(t))) − 1
i 
 dt
−
·
u0 (c (b, a (t)))
u0 (c (z (t−) , a (t)))
− 1
¸
dqs (t)
−
·
u0 (c (w, a (t)))
u0 (c (z (t−) , a (t)))
− 1
¸
dqm (t) . (44)
Applying the change-of-variables formula from Sennewald and Wa¨lde (2006, Cor. 3)23 on
the general Keynes-Ramsey rule (44) and the mapping x 7→ u0−1 (x), where u is given by
(3), finally yields Keynes-Ramsey (16).
A.3. The consumption good is normal. In the following we show that the con-
sumption good is a normal, i.e., ∂c (z, a) /∂a > 0, z ∈ {b, w}. The derivation is in analogy
to Chang (2004, Subsec. 4.3.1) who considers a consumption-investment problem with
Brownian motion as noise. We exploit that utility function (3) is concave and that budget
constraint (1) is linear in a and c.
Let a1 and a2 be two diﬀerent initial levels of wealth, with corresponding optimal
wealth and consumption processes ai (t) and ci (t) ≡ c (z (t) , ai (t)), i = 1, 2. Then we
define for λ ∈ [0, 1], aλ (t) ≡ λa1 (t) + (1− λ) a2 (t) and cλ (t) ≡ λc1 (t) + (1− λ) c2 (t).
As by linearity of budget constraint (1) we obtain daλ (t) = [raλ (t) + z (t)− cλ (t)] dt, we
conclude that aλ (t) is the wealth process associated to cλ (t). By definition of the value
function V and using the concavity of u we obtain then
V (z, aλ) ≥ E0
R∞
t0
e−ρ(t−t0)u (cλ (t)) dt
≥ E0
R∞
t0
e−ρ(t−t0) [λu (c (z (t) , a1 (t))) + (1− λ) u (c (z (t) , a2 (t)))] dt
= λV (z, a1) + (1− λ)V (z, a2) .
This chain of inequalities shows that the value function is concave in a, which, under
suitable smoothness assumptions, is equivalent to ∂2V (z, a) / (∂a)2 < 0. Now, diﬀerenti-
ating the first-order condition (42) for maximizing the HJB equation with respect to a,
we find that u00 (c (z, a)) ∂c (z, a) /∂a = ∂2V (z, a) / (∂a)2. Hence, as both u00 (c (z, a)) and
∂2V (z, a) / (∂a)2 are negative, we obtain that ∂c (z, a) /∂a > 0.
23The reader may also resort to Chapter ?? of the present thesis, which is a slightly modified version
of Sennewald and Wa¨lde (2006).
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A.4. Saving and Dissaving.
A.4.1. Saving and dissaving during unemployment. In this section we consider the
saving behavior for either employment status. We start with the case of unemployment.
The job case is presented in the following subsection.
Lemma 2. While unemployed, the agent
(1) dissaves (and
dc(b,ab(t))
c(b,ab(t))
< 0) if either
(a) r ≤ ρ or
(b)
ρ < r < ρ+ λm, (45)
and c (w, a) <
³
1− r−ρλm
´−1/σ
c (b, a);
(2) saves (and
dc(b,ab(t))
c(b,ab(t))
> 0) if either
(a) r ≥ ρ+ λm or
(b) (45) holds and c (w, a) >
³
1− r−ρλm
´−1/σ
c (b, a);
(3) spends exactly his total income, ra+b, on consumption if (45) holds and c (w, a) =³
1− r−ρλm
´−1/σ
c (b, a).
Proof. First, we recall that, as the consumption good is normal and labor income
between jumps constant, dc
¡
b, ab (t)
¢
/c
¡
b, ab (t)
¢
> 0 iﬀ the agent is saving. Using the
reduced form (18), we find thus that the agent saves iﬀ
r > ρ+ λm
£
1− χ (a)−σ
¤
. (46)
Since χ (a) > 1, a suﬃcient condition for this inequality to hold true is r ≥ ρ + λm,
whereas a necessary condition is given by r > ρ. That is, for r ≥ ρ+ λm an unemployed
agent always saves, while for r ≤ ρ he always dissaves. This proves points 1a) and 2a).
For the remaining constellation (45), the parameters do not provide such a clear
distinction between saving and dissaving. However, further rearranging of (46) shows
that the agent saves iﬀ c (w, a) <
³
1− r−ρλm
´−1/σ
c (b, a), which yields points 1b), 2b), and
3. Notice that here inequality (45) implies that the term 1− r−ρλm is greater than 0, which
in turn ensures that
³
1− r−ρλm
´−1/σ
is well defined. ¤
The following lemma focuses on the “in-between” cases 1b), 2b) and 3, in which the
interest rate satisfies (45) and where we do not know much about whether and when an
unemployed agent is saving or dissaving. The results are depicted in Figure 4.
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Figure 4. Saving behavior during unemployment if ρ < r < ρ+ λm.
Lemma 3. For any interest rate r satisfying (45) there exists a level of wealth, abr > a
b,
with the following properties. For a < abr an unemployed agent dissaves, for a > a
b
r he
saves, while at abr he spends his total income on consumption, i.e., c
¡
b, abr
¢
= rabr + b.
Furthermore, the level abr is decreasing in r and limr&ρ a
b
r =∞ and limr%ρ+λm abr = ab.
Proof. We recall from Lemma 2 that only interest rates satisfying (45) are sensible
for the case under consideration. Otherwise the agent would always save or always dissave.
We show that (i) for any r satisfying (45) there exists abr, (ii) a
b
r is decreasing in r, and
(iii) the limit properties limr&ρ abr =∞ and limr%ρ+λm abr = ab hold.
(i) Define on the interval [ρ, ρ+ λm] × (ab,∞) the function h (r, a) ≡ r − ρ
−λm
£
1− χr (a)−σ
¤
, where the superscript “r” from χr (a) indicates that the optimal
consumption rule and thus χ (a) depend on r. According to (46), the agent saves iﬀ
h (r, a) > 0. Recalling the properties of χ (a) stated in Section 3, we find that, for any
fixed r ∈ (ρ, ρ+ λ), h (r, a) is increasing in a starting from r − ρ − λm < 0 (as a & ab)
and converging toward r− ρ > 0 (as a%∞). There exists thus a level abr > ab such that
h
¡
r, abr
¢
= 0, h (r, a) < 0 for a < abr, and h (r, a) > 0 for a > a
b
r.
(ii) Consider two interest rate r1 < r2 satisfying (45). As shown in (i), there exist ab1
and ab2 with h
¡
ri, abi
¢
= 0, i = 1, 2. Then, as r2 > r1, we conclude that by plausibility
– higher interest rates trigger a higher saving rate – for r2 the agent saves at ab1 which
means that h
¡
r2, ab1
¢
> 0. Hence, again with (i), we now deduce that ab1 > a
b
2, which
shows that abr is decreasing in r.
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(iii) Consider the limits A ≡ limr&ρ abr and B ≡ limr%ρ+λm abr and assume that A <∞
and B > ab. Since r is drawn from a closed interval and since abr is decreasing in
r (as shown in (ii)), it follows that A = maxr∈[ρ,ρ+λm] a
b
r and h (ρ,A) = 0 as well as
B = minr∈[ρ,ρ+λm] a
b
r and h (ρ+ λm, B) = 0. Thus, the unemployed agent does not
dissave for r = ρ and a = A as well as he does not save for r = ρ+ λm and a = B. This
behavior is a contradiction to points 1a) and 2a) in Lemma 2. We hence conclude that
A =∞ and B = ab. ¤
Remark 3. Interestingly, some of the previous results can also be derived graphically.
Consider Figure 4 that illustrates the case of unemployment for ρ < r < ρ + λm, i.e.,
points 1b), 2b), and 3 from Lemma 2. We know from Section 3 that the c (b, a)-curve
lies between the cmin (a)- and the cE (b, a)-line (depicted by the lower and upper dashed
line, respectively). These lines start in −b/r and −Ωb, respectively, and their slope is
equal to [ρ− (1− σ) r] /r. The zero-motion line for ab (t) reads c = ra + b, starts as
the cmin (a)-line in −b/r and has slope r. Since r > ρ, the zero-motion line is steeper
than both the cmin (a)- and the cE (b, a)-line. Thus, as −Ωb < −b/r, the zero-motion line
intersects the cE (b, a)-line, while it lies always above that zero-motion line. It therefore
intersects the c (b, a)-curve, which lies between the cmin (a)- and the cE (b, a)-line, at some
abr > −b/r > ab. We can then see that the agent dissaves for a < abr (the c (b, a)-curve
lies above the zero-motion line) and saves for a > abr (the c (b, a)-curve lies below the
zero-motion line), while at abr, c
¡
b, abr
¢
= rabr + b.
A.4.2. Saving and dissaving while employed in a job. We now consider the saving
behavior for the job case. As in case of unemployment most of the following results could
also be derived and illustrated graphically, cf. Remark 3.
Lemma 4. While the worker is employed in a job, he
(1) dissaves (and dc(w,a
w(t))
c(w,aw(t)) < 0) if r < ρ and c (w, a) <
³
1 + ρ−rλs
´1/σ
c (b, a);
(2) saves (and dc(w,a
w(t))
c(w,aw(t)) > 0) if either
(a) r ≥ ρ or
(b) r < ρ and c (w, a) >
³
1 + ρ−rλs
´1/σ
c (b, a);
(3) spends exactly his total current income on consumption if r < ρ and c (w, a) =³
1 + ρ−rλs
´1/σ
c (b, a).
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Proof of Lemma 4. According to the reduced form (20) we obtain that the agent
saves iﬀ
r > ρ− λs [χ (aw)σ − 1] . (47)
Since χ (a) > 1, a suﬃcient condition for this inequality to hold true is simply r ≥ ρ,
which yields point 2a). Note that a necessary condition expressed in terms of primitives
as in the case of unemployment cannot be given here since the right-hand of (47) tends
toward −∞ as a& ab and we assumed that r > 0. That means there is no positive lower
bound for the right-hand side of (47) such that for interest rates below that bound, (47)
does never hold true.
Points 1), 2b), and 3 follow immediately by rearranging (47). ¤
In the following lemma we present more precise results on the saving behavior if r < ρ.
Lemma 5. For any r < ρ there exists a level of wealth, awr > ab, with the following
properties. The worker saves at a < awr , dissaves at a > a
w
r , and spends his total income
on consumption at awr , i.e., c (w, a
w
r ) = ra
w
r + w. Furthermore, the level a
w
r is increasing
in r and limr&0 awr ≥ ab and limr%ρ awr =∞.
Proof. The arguments applied here are similar to those in the proof of Lemma 3.
First note that, according to Lemma 4, only interest rates r < ρ are sensible for the case
under consideration. We show then that (i) for any r < ρ there exists such an awr , (ii) a
w
r
is increasing in r, and (iii) the limit properties limr&0 awr ≥ ab and limr%ρ awr =∞ hold.
(i) In analogy to the case of unemployment, we define on the interval (0, ρ]× (ab,∞)
a function h (r, a) ≡ r − ρ + λs [χr (aw)σ − 1]. According to (47), the agent saves iﬀ
h (r, a) > 0. For any fixed r, h (r, a) is decreasing in a and tends toward ∞ as a & ab
and toward r − ρ < 0 as a → ∞. There exists thus a level awr such that h (r, awr ) = 0,
h (r, a) > 0 for a < awr , and h (r, a) < 0 for a > a
w
r .
(ii) Consider two interest rate r1 < r2 < ρ and denote for i = 1, 2 by awi the level
of wealth with h (ri, awi ) = 0. Since r2 > r1, the agent saves for r2 and at a
w
1 , i.e.,
h (r2, aw1 ) > 0. From (i) we then deduce that a
w
1 < a
w
2 .
(iii) We consider first the limit A ≡ limr%ρ awr . Assume that A < ∞. As awr is
increasing in r, we obtain that A = maxr∈(0,ρ] awr and h (ρ,A) = 0. Hence, the agent does
not save for r = ρ and at a = A, which stands in contradiction to point 2a) in Lemma
4. Thus, A = ∞. We now turn to limr&0 awr . Since according to (i) awr > ab for all
0 < r < ρ, we conclude that limr&0 awr ≥ ab. Unfortunately, equality cannot be shown
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since we do not know whether limr&0 h (r, a) is negative. (Only negativity would allow to
prove equality, similarly to the derivation of limr%ρ+λm a
b
r = a
b in point (iii) of the proof
of Lemma 3.) ¤
A.5. The expected consumption growth. We first present a derivation of the
expected consumption growth rate (27) and state then a technical lemma that is useful
for the analysis in Section 6.
For sake of notational convenience we set c (t) ≡ c (z (t) , a (t)). The expected con-
sumption growth rate is given by the limit
Et0
dc (t)
c (t)
= lim
∆t→0
Et0
c (t+∆t)− c (t)
c (t)
= lim
∆t→0
Et0
1
c (t)
Et [c (t+∆t)− c (t)] , (48)
where for the second step we use the properties of the conditional expectation. We now
write Keynes-Ramsey rule (16) in integral notation, which yields
c (t) =
R t
t0



r − ρ
σ
+ λs
h
c(τ)
c(b,a(τ))
iσ
− 1
σ
+ λm
h
c(τ)
c(w,a(τ))
iσ
− 1
σ


 c (τ) dτ
+
R t
t0
[c (b, a (τ))− c (τ−)] dqs (τ) +
R t
t0
[c (w, a (τ))− c (τ−)] dqm (τ) .
Inserting this expression into (48) and using the martingale property of the compensated
Poisson processes gives24
Et0
dc (t)
c (t)
= lim
∆t→0
Et0
1
c (t)
Et
R t+∆t
t



r−ρ
σ + λs
[ c(τ)c(b,a(τ)) ]
σ
−1
σ + λm
[ c(τ)c(w,a(τ)) ]
σ
−1
σ
λs
h
c(b,a(τ))
c(τ) − 1
i
+ λm
h
c(w,a(τ))
c(τ) − 1
i


 c (τ) dτ.
By interchanging limit and expectation and applying thatEtx (t) = x (t) for all (z(t),a(t))-
measurable random variables x (t), we obtain further
Et0
dc (t)
c (t)
= Et0



r−ρ
σ + λs
½
[ c(t)c(b,a(t)) ]
σ
−1
σ +
h
c(b,a(t))
c(t) − 1
i¾
+λm
½
[ c(t)c(w,a(t)) ]
σ
−1
σ +
h
c(w,a(t))
c(t) − 1
i¾



dt.
24Roughly speaking, the martingale property yields for t ≤ T that Etdq˜ (T ) = 0, where q˜ (t) =
q (t)−λt and q (t) is a Poisson process with arrival rate λ. As a consequence, for any integrable stochastic
process x (t) one obtains that Et
R T
t x (τ) dq˜ (τ) = 0, cf. also Garc´ıa and Griego (1994).
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As z (t) in c (t) = c (z (t) , a (t)) can only take the values b and w, we can write, using the
linearity of the expectation operator,
Et0
dc (t)
c (t)
=



r−ρ
σ + λsEt0
½
1{z(t)=w}
·
[ c(w,a(t))c(b,a(t)) ]
σ
−1
σ +
c(b,a(t))
c(w,a(t)) − 1
¸¾
+λmEt0
½
1{z(t)=b}
·
[ c(b,a(t))c(w,a(t)) ]
σ
−1
σ +
c(w,a(t))
c(b,a(t)) − 1
¸¾



dt. (49)
Since for given a0 and z0 the employment status at t ≥ t0 is independent of the level of
wealth at t, we obtain, for example, further
Et0


1{z(t)=w}
h
c(w,a(t))
c(b,a(t))
iσ
− 1
σ


 = Et0
£
1{z(t)=w}
¤
Et0



h
c(w,a(t))
c(b,a(t))
iσ
− 1
σ



= pwz0 (t0, t)Et0



h
c(w,a(t))
c(b,a(t))
iσ
− 1
σ


 ,
where for the second equality we refer to Appendix A.1.1. Proceeding analogously with
the other conditional expectations in (49), we finally arrive at diﬀerential (27) from the
text.
The subsequent lemma applies when we show that risk of unemployment yields higher
expected consumption growth.
Lemma 6. Define for σ, α > 0 the function H (x) ≡ xσ−1σ −
1−x−α
α , x > 0. Then for
all x 6= 1, H (x) > 0.
Proof. Obviously, H (1) = 0. As the derivative H 0 (x) ≡ xσ−1 − x−(α+1) is greater
(less) than zero for x > 1 (x < 1), we find that H (x) is increasing (decreasing) for x > 1
(x < 1). Jointly with H (1) = 0 that means that H (x) is strictly positive for all x > 0,
x 6= 1. ¤
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